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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

USSR'S 'PEACE POLICY' OUTLINED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 80 pp 2-5

[Article by I. Zeuskov: "The Leninist Peace Policy"]

[Text]

Preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress are under way in the Soviet Union. The Soviet people are summing up the results of their diverse activity over the past five years and are discussing the prospects for the further progress of the USSR towards the building of communism. The creative programmes and plans of the Party derive from the prerequisite that their realisation will take place only in conditions of peace.

The preservation and strengthening of world peace and cooperation is the mainspring of the USSR's foreign policy. Back in 1917, the first legislative act of the young Soviet Republic — Lenin's Decree on Peace — proclaimed the basic principles of Soviet foreign policy. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state are constantly struggling for peace throughout the world, countering the imperialist policy of aggression and national enmity, colonial oppression and predatory wars with the just policy of the international fraternity of workers and the friendship of the peoples of all countries, and of peaceful coexistence among states with differing socio-political systems.

Convincing proof of this unswerving and consistent course was the Peace Programme adopted at the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses. It embodied the foreign policy initiatives elaborated by the CPSU Central Committee and the Politbureau of the Central Committee headed by Comrade Leonid I. Brezhnev and outlined the milestones in the positive international transformations that have taken place in the world. Thanks to the joint efforts of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and with the support of all peace-loving forces, it has become possible to break the tragic cycle where peace was merely a break between world wars, and to mount an extremely

wide-scale struggle to rid human society of war forever. Over 35 years of peace, in which the whole of Europe as well as the Soviet Union has been living and working—such is the tremendous achievement of the Leninist foreign policy of the CPSU.

As is known, important positive changes took place in the world arena in the 1970s. During this decade the relaxation of international tensions became a reality and it became possible to solve many outstanding problems inherited from the Second World War and from two decades of cold war. In the process of détente peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems strengthened and began to be filled with concrete economic and political content.

Supporting the resolution of the 34th session of the UN General Assembly to declare the 80s the second decade of disarmament, the USSR tabled a series of highly-principled proposals aimed at maintaining, formalising and developing all the positive achievements that had been scored in the curbing of the arms race and at making substantial headway in the struggle for peace.

At the threshold of the 80s, however, militarist forces and the heads of the military and political NATO bloc, and of the United States in particular, in a bid to bring the objective process of the renewal of peace to a halt, embarked on a course for changing in their favour the strategic balance of forces in the world, for rupturing détente, escalating the arms race and for creating new hotbeds of tension and for unleashing provocations against the socialist and other independent states. Aggressive imperialist circles again began fanning out the myth of the "Soviet military threat," their propaganda uses a false thesis that mankind has come up against a totally new situation in which there is allegedly no place for peaceful cooperation and the strengthening of détente.

The détente process was never a smooth one, taking place within a fierce struggle against the forces of imperialism and reaction. However, the change in the balance of forces in favour of peace, democracy and socialism, as well as military-political, economic and social factors are pointing towards détente. As the resolution of the June 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee states, "the relaxation of tension has struck deep roots in modern international life and real preconditions exist for preserving it as the dominant tendency in world politics." The number of representatives of various circles advocating a weighed, realistic approach to the various events, phenomena and facts of international life is on the rise as well.

The recent development of the world situation has shown that despite the attempts of reactionary imperialist circles to jeopardise the policy being determined by the concept of détente, peace forces dispose of a great potential and reserves for preserving and augmenting all the good that was done for mankind in the 70s. This, above all, is the will and desire of all nations for peace, the substantially reduced possibilities of imperialists to play the master in the world arena as they see fit, the steady rise of the forces of progress, democracy and socialism, and the consolidation of the powerful socialist camp — the main impediment to the forces of aggression and reaction.

The vigorous and active diplomacy of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries is aimed at continuing the improvement of the world political climate which was begun in the past decade.

A contributing factor to the development of détente and the solution of pressing international problems are the Declaration and Statement of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States which were adopted this past May. These documents contain a concrete and constructive programme of measures which the socialist countries are convinced are necessary for the elimination of hotbeds of tension and trends in world developments which are dangerous for all nations, and for the realisation of military détente, disarmament and the development of mutually advantageous cooperation between states.

Of paramount importance are the proposals for the organisation of a world summit meeting, the cessation of the production, the liquidation of nuclear stockpiles, the prohibition of the creation of new types and systems of mass destruction weapons, and the reduction of defence budgets.

The Warsaw Treaty Member-States reaffirmed their determination to continue the struggle for the strengthening of security, the development of cooperation in Europe, world peace, freedom and independence, détente and disarmament. They expressed their readiness to collaborate closely in this struggle with all states and social forces vitally concerned in the strengthening of peace and security.

A great positive impact on the situation in Europe was made by the signing in Helsinki five years ago of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation, to whose elaboration a major contribution was made by the Soviet Union and the European countries of the socialist community. In a "Pravda" interview Leonid Brezhnev stated that it can rightly be compared "with a good breakwater which stands in the way of whatever undermines the foundation of détente." The proposal of the USSR and the European socialist countries to hold a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe is meeting with more and more support.

A real possibility for halting the arms race is being created by the new Soviet initiatives on medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Basing itself on the principle of equality of the sides and guided by the interests of peace and security, the Soviet Union is proposing that discussion be inaugurated on the question of medium-range nuclear weapons in close connection with the question of American forward-based nuclear missiles. This means that possible accords on these issues can be realised in practice only after the entry into force of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2).

The Soviet Union is making tremendous efforts to impart new momentum to the search for mutually acceptable solutions at the Vienna negotiations on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The Warsaw Treaty countries advanced a new constructive proposal in accordance with which the USSR is prepared to reduce its forces by 20,000 men provided that the US reduces its forces by 13,000. And this does not include the unilateral withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet servicemen from Central Europe.

An important contribution to the improvement of the atmosphere on the European continent and the rest of the world is being made by top-level bilateral contacts between states with differing social systems.

Convincing proof of the highly-principled consistency of the Soviet Union in the struggle to strengthen peace and continue dialogue in the spirit of détente and cooperation was the meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing in Warsaw, and the negotiations between Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei

Kosygin and Andrei Gromyko and FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his deputy, FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The Soviet and West German leaders reaffirmed their adherence to détente, considering it necessary, possible and beneficial. They expressed their desire to do everything in their power to see that it remains the leading trend in international relations.

Of great significance in this respect is the 35th session of the UN General Assembly held last September. New constructive Soviet proposals aimed at strengthening détente, curbing the arms race and keeping back the threat of a nuclear war, set forth in the USSR Memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, for Guarantees of International Security" and in the plenary speech of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko were actively supported and approved not only by many UN members, but also by world public opinion. Tremendous interest was aroused by L. I. Brezhnev's statement in his September 30 Kremlin speech, in which he said: "...the USSR once again proposed from the UN rostrum an entire series of measures to strengthen peace and make the international atmosphere healthier. Such a course takes the realities of the world of today into account. It is understandable to the people and is in accord with their dreams. The future belongs to it."

The present world situation, exacerbated through the fault of imperialist forces, those of the US in particular, has advanced with particular urgency before the peace forces the task of unmasking the intrigues of the enemies of peace and social progress. Making demagogical references to the "Afghan events," the Washington Administration is taking actions harmful to the cause of peace and détente and is resurrecting the worst years of the cold war. However, such actions, as the events have shown, merely serve to heighten mistrust towards US foreign policy. The nations of the world are becoming more and more convinced that adventurist goals, goals dangerous for the cause of peace, underlie this policy. It becomes evident that the strategy of the US ruling circles based on the principles of the notorious presidential directive No. 59, their claims to world domination and striving to settle international issues from the position of strength are doomed to failure.

The vigorous multifarious activity of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community is the stabilising factor in current world relations. Even politicians who were never friends of the Soviet Union or supporters of communism now have to reckon with this. However, owing to the reactionary and aggressive nature of imperialism they have not ceased in their attempts to achieve military superiority over socialism, and are unleashing provocations against socialist and other independent states, resorting to covert actions against

countries which have embarked on the road of revolutionary socio-economic transformations. It is precisely for this reason that détente as an inexorable result of the definite balance of forces on the world arena which took shape during the last decade was subjected, and is now being subjected to particularly vicious attacks by those who claim domination over other countries and peoples. Even though there can be no doubt as to the right of each nation to choose the social system it wishes, the imperialists and their accomplices infringe on this right every time a country departs from their diktat, by interfering in its internal affairs directly or through their hirelings.

Strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states and respect for their independence and sovereignty is one of the hallmark conditions of détente. But this very condition does not suit imperialism, American imperialism in particular, which is trying to legalise the export of counter-revolution by force of arms, to regain lost positions in various parts of the world and to turn them into spheres of the US "vital interests."

In exchange for recognising peaceful coexistence and détente, the leaders of the capitalist states would have the socialist countries and the Communist and Workers' Parties refrain from their support of revolutionary democratic movements in non-socialist countries and from solidarity with fighters for peace and democracy. But they will not succeed in drawing the countries of the socialist community from internationalist positions.

The USSR and the other fraternal socialist states consider it their sacred duty to furnish moral, political and other requisite aid to all revolutionary forces in the struggle against the exploiters and colonisers, against imperialism. And this is not "export of the revolution" which bourgeois ideologists are accusing the socialist countries of. Revolutions are not made to order or by invitation. "There is no force on earth," stated Leonid Brezhnev, "which could reverse the inexorable process of the renewal of social life. Where there is colonialism, there will be a struggle for national liberation. Where there is exploitation, there will be a liberation struggle. Where there is aggression, there will be stiff opposition to it."

The circles which are instigating an armed struggle against democratic Afghanistan, which are stepping up military preparations in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, which are attempting to bring Iran to its knees, which are creating new friction in Southeast Asia, which are unleashing provocations against Cuba, and which are trying to drown the struggle of the people of El Salvador and other countries in blood—are united by their fear of the unshakable process of social change.

A new dangerous phenomenon in world politics, one dangerous for the whole of mankind, is the partnership between imperialism and Chinese hegemonism, the coalescence of the aggressive circles of the West, led by the United States, with the Peking leadership. One of the objects of this alliance's aggression was Afghanistan, which Washington and Peking had intended to draw into the orbit of the imperialist, anti-Soviet policy. The enemies of the Afghan Revolution miscalculated, however. The diverse aid furnished to Afghanistan by the Soviet Union at the former's request ruled out the possibility that the April Revolution of 1978 would be stifled from without, and that a pro-imperialist spring-board of military aggression would be created on the southern borders of the USSR. The imperialists and their accomplices entertain false hopes of repeating

the Chilean version of counter-revolution in Afghanistan. The sooner they realise that it is imperative to reach a political settlement of the situation which took shape in Afghanistan on the basis of the specific proposals advanced by the DRA government, the better. This requires the full cessation of aggression against Afghanistan and reliable guarantees against subversion from abroad.

Today life in Afghanistan itself is gradually returning to normal. Large bands of counter-revolutionaries have been destroyed. The interventionists have suffered a major defeat. It was in these conditions that the Soviet Union took the decision to withdraw a part of the military contingent stationed in Afghanistan. This is being done in agreement with the Afghan government. Of course, as L. I. Brezhnev has stated, we will continue to help Afghanistan build a new life and safeguard the gains of the April Revolution.

The strategists of "psychological warfare" will stoop to any tactics in their attacks on real socialism. They supplement their proclamations of the nonexistent "Soviet threat" with sombre forecasts of the inevitability of a new world war. The sowers of false fears want to deprive nations of the prospect of a peaceful future. On the other hand, the entire postwar history, the last decade in particular, has graphically confirmed the conclusion of the CPSU that in the present age there is no irreversible inevitability of a new world war.

The concerted actions of the socialist community countries, the world labour movement and fighters for national liberation, all progressive, peace-loving forces and realistic statesmen and political figures can prevent the decline to a new world war. While not falling into placidity and not closing their eyes to the real dangers behind the imperialist policy of military confrontation, the

advocates of peace decisively censure the pessimistic sentiments being spread for the purpose of breaking the will of the peoples and undermining their struggle against the arms race.

The World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace held in Bulgaria last September is a great mobilising force in the struggle for peace, détente, national independence, freedom and social progress. The 2,260 participants included representatives of various mass organisations, political parties, workers in the art, scientists, religious leaders, social workers and politicians from 137 countries. The Parliament adopted a Charter calling for struggle against warmongers, for decisive onslaught of peace-loving forces, for bringing about a turning point in curbing the arms drive.

Important objective factors are working in favour of peace and détente. The military-strategic balance between the socialist world and the capitalist world is a fundamental, historic achievement which can hold the imperialists' aspirations in check. The efficacy and scope of the international solidarity of the Communists of most countries have risen. One example is this year's meeting in Paris of European Communist and Workers' Parties, whose decisions have helped invigorate anti-military forces of different political persuasions in the safeguarding of world peace and security.

The Soviet people have no cause for alarm or uncertainty. Our country knows how to stand up for itself. The Soviet Union is demonstrating control and calm in the current tense world situation, not falling for malevolent provocations. Together with the other socialist countries the USSR is countering the stoking of a war hysteria and pessimistic forecasts with the firm conviction that there exist real possibilities for ensuring the normal, peaceful development of relations among all states and for frustrating the designs of the aggressive circles of the West and their Peking accomplices.

The Soviet people wholeheartedly endorse the foreign policy of the Party and the government, and the work of the CPSU Central Committee, the Politbureau of the Central Committee and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade Leonid I. Brezhnev, in carrying out the Leninist foreign policy course of the 24th and 25th Party congresses. The Resolution of the June Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee "On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union" has had

world-wide repercussions. This primarily applies to the determination expressed in the Resolution to work, despite the adventuristic actions of the US and its accomplices, for the preservation and development of détente and for mutually advantageous cooperation between states in the economy, science and culture. The Plenary Meeting emphasised, however, that "the intrigues of imperialism and other enemies of peace require a vigilance and the all-round strengthening of the defence potential of our state in order to frustrate the plans of imperialism aimed at reaching military superiority and establishing a world diktat."

The entire activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state is permeated with the spirit of historical optimism. This invaluable quality of socialist foreign policy is highly natural, since it serves the people and is geared to the building of socialism and communism, to the interests of peace and social progress for the whr's of mankind. The confidence in the correctness of the peace-loving internationalist ideas being upheld by Soviet diplomacy is augmenting its strength and winning it the support and gratitude of the masses across the globe.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS IN SOCIALISM VERSUS CAPITALISM

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 80 pp 46-48

[Article by Lieutenant-General D. Volkogonov, dr. sc. (Philosophy), professor: "War of Ideas"]

[Text]

Present-day world development is distinguished by a bitter struggle between the antagonising systems of socialism and capitalism which represent the forces of progress on the one side and the forces of reaction on the other. Waged in various fields this struggle is especially uncompromising in the sphere of ideas. The war of ideas, as a form of class struggle, reflects the confrontation of the two worlds in the spiritual field. In this war the front line goes through the hearts and minds of millions of people and moulds their outlooks, ideals, views, convictions and feelings.

The war of ideas knows neither lulls, nor respite for the fighters. Erecting obstacles to the peaceful advance of socialism, the world reactionary forces never miss a chance to pass over to local counteroffensives, using their habitual weapons: anticomunism, nationalism, racism, neofascism.

The present stage in this ideological war which the world progressive forces are fighting against the forces of imperialism and Maoism has a number of specific features both in its content and its forms.

Imperialism: Torpedoing Détente

The 70s were marked by an improvement in the international situation. The persistent efforts of the USSR and the fraternal socialist states led to something new in relations between states, namely to détente — which is essentially the natural result of the change in the world balance of forces.

Détente provided wide possibilities for diminishing the threat of a new world war, for establishing comprehensive economic and cultural cooperation between states belonging to different social systems. However, in recent years the

militarist forces in the West and in China, fearing the social changes détente may bring about, have been pushing the world back to cold war. They put forward plans for achieving military superiority over the world of socialism trying to justify this through ideological prestidigitation.

The proponents of capitalism and Maoism for that matter describe détente as a fairyland, pointing to what they call the mounting war potential of the USSR and the alleged threat it presents to

the Western world and China. They harp on the same string of a Soviet menace to wrest public consent to heavier military budgets for new weapons systems at the expense of the social services or to justify NATO's military adventures. L. I. Brezhnev said: "In fact, of course, there is no Soviet threat either to the West or to the East. It is all a monstrous lie from beginning to end."

The actual menace to world peace comes from imperialism and its military-industrial complex which continues to accelerate the arms race. The NATO countries alone (less the USA) spend over 150 thousand million dollars to keep their war machine running. In fiscal 1980 US military spending has reached that figure and it increases by 5 to 7 per cent every year.

Washington and Peking sponsor wide-scale interference in Afghanistan's affairs under the phony pretext that the Soviet fraternal help to the neighbour nation constitutes nothing less than a threat to the whole world. This big lie is only a feeble attempt to cover up the determination of the militarist circles to torpedo détente and to whip up the arms race.

All these lamentations concerning a Soviet threat prove to be absolute humbug when viewed in a proper realistic perspective. The world socialist system though more powerful than ever before, concentrates its efforts on a peaceful "offensive." Peaceful in its essence, socialism is optimistic about the victorious outcome of this offensive in the long run, and this is sufficient to utterly refute the moth-eaten stock phrase about a "Soviet military threat."

Yet politicians and the mass media in the West still cling to the hypocritical and worn out charge that the current arms build-up and war preparations in the West are forced on it by "imminent communist aggression." This is only natural. Whatever the state of relations in the world, militarism will always need "evidence" of some threat from outside to justify its own expansionist plans. The proponents of capitalism, however efficient in twisting facts, could hardly whitewash the militarist tendencies in present-day Western political life without "conclusive evidence" of an impending Soviet aggression.

Recommendations on how to wage the ideological and psychological war against socialism are worked out by numerous, mostly American scientific centres. Here are a few of them. The Hoover Institute of War, Revolution and Peace in California has for the past 50 years been carrying out capital research of the ways to "loosen up" and "soften" world socialism. Its output is consumed by the subversive radio and printing agencies. A prominent place in this unseemly warfare belongs to the CIA-sponsored Hudson Institute. The Columbia University Institute on Communism in New York generally works on questions concerning operations on the occasion of specific historical and political events. The training of specialists for psychological warfare is assigned to the Russian Center, University of Columbia. Its graduates — journalists, sociologists, historians and other "Sovietologists" can be found in practically all the anti-Soviet centers and editorial boards of various "voices." There are nearly two hundred such centers around the United States — institutes, committees, funds, councils, associations, legions, programmes, etc. Many subversion centers are maintained in other capitalist countries too. Most of them are state financed and function on the orders of militaristic monopoly groups.

The leading role in the subversion propaganda machine is assigned to the mass media. Apart from the widely known BBC, "Voice of America," "Free Europe," "Liberty," "Deutsche Welle" dozens of other radio stations carry on psychological sabotage. The weekly broadcasts for the

USSR alone exceed 1,500 hours in 24 national languages. The military propaganda machine has equally enormous facilities. In one of his books T. Coffin, an American sociologist, points out that the Pentagon possesses a huge propaganda machine for psychological warfare and indoctrination of its own personnel. The US armed forces overseas operate 250 powerful broadcasting stations and 24 TV studios.

All these facilities are aimed at the minds of the people in the socialist countries for the purpose of psychological sabotage. The great variety of methods used includes deception which consists in deliberate presentation of false data with the view to mislead the public. It usually combines either a half truth or an outright lie with a certain amount of actual facts.

Another trick is defamation. This one is aimed at casting aspersions on personalities, state and political bodies, campaigns or events to deprive them of credibility in the eyes of the people. This method is used by bourgeois propaganda to pre-

vent the public in the socialist and developing countries from attaching too much significance to some event or political act. Whenever some fact or political feature in capitalist reality becomes embarrassing the bourgeois propaganda machine resorts to "barrage" technique, which directs the public outbursts towards some politically insignificant event. Similar tactics are employed to divert the public attention from major political issues in the world such as congresses of the Communist Parties, important political initiatives of the socialist and developing countries, etc. Instead, a noisy campaign is organised around some minor event or a cooked-up case of an anti-communism or anti-Sovietism.

Affecting objectiveness and independence the capitalist mass media keep on rehashing social illusions and political myths such as "personal freedom," "Western democracy" and the like. They thereby carefully avoid mentioning that capitalism gave birth to fascism, unemployment, exploitation and spiritual slavery. Nor would they admit that capitalism bears the responsibility for this century's two world wars and innumerable local conflicts which carried away millions of human lives.

All the political and ideological actions of the enemies of peace are carried out under the flag of anti-communism. The present-day "free world" is torn apart by rivalry and competition, and anti-Soviet feeling is probably the only basis on which the anti-socialist forces can still agree and coordinate their war-like efforts. The June 1980 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out that anti-communism and anti-

Sovietism have now been turned into an instrument for whipping up the arms race. They have become a means of struggle not only against the USSR and other socialist countries, not only against Communists, but also against all the war-opposing and peace-loving forces. They have been turned into a means of undermining detente. This unholy alliance of the imperialist forces is acting in close cooperation with the Peking leaders who have finally betrayed the revolutionary ideals.

Maoism: Siding with Reaction

The Peking leaders having taken the path of treachery to the interests of the workers, cannot but go further. In the past five years they have gone from political flirting to direct siding with imperialist reaction on an anti-Soviet basis. From a potential reserve Peking has virtually grown into a regular ally of imperialism. Among the key factors that brought Peking to this cesspool are the hegemonic and militarist mentality of the Chinese top rulers and their anti-Soviet course.

Peking's anti-Sovietism arises from the fact that the USSR is the main obstacle to Chinese great power aspirations. This attitude was prevalent under Mao and it remains so under the present leadership. "Hu Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping," says K. Menneri, FRG politologist, in his book "Mao's Heirs," "have retained and invariably follow the two basic commandments of the 'great helmsmen': China's No. 1 enemy is the USSR. China's ally is anybody provided he is an enemy of the USSR." This maniacal idea underlies the mentality of the Peking leaders and determines their overall political activity.

All this not only testifies to Peking's profound degeneration but also proves its complicity with imperialism. The Chinese leaders openly admitted this during the talks with Harold Brown, US Defence Secretary, in Peking early this year. According to their joint statement their common platform consists in "coordinated opposition to the USSR proceeding from closeness of interests of the USA and China."

The US-Chinese political and military alliance though formally not sealed is assuming quite definite outlines. The birth of this diplomatic bastard has greatly worsened the international situation in the recent period. China's rapprochement with the capitalist world intensifies its clearly obstructionist attitude towards burning world issues. It has not signed nor does it recognise a single international agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons and limitation of their testing, it disregards all agreements on restraining the arms race.

All this is ideologically camouflaged with speculation about "Soviet military threat," concern for the interests of the developing countries and so on.

China's secret complicity with the NATO states gives a new impulse to the arms build-up in those countries. In an effort to upset the existing balance of forces their leaders are intensifying the development of new weapons, establishing new war bases, stepping up the deployment of mobile forces, reviving the crumbling imperialist alliances. The Chinese leaders try to justify this and their own war preparations by the time worn "threat from the North."

The militarist psychosis is highly favourable to the Peking leaders, who are anxious to get access to the NATO arsenals. The Chinese emissaries have been commuting between the Western capitals for the past two years. Peking top official delegations take turns to visit war plants, finger the hardware and reckon the possibilities of its production at home. According to the West German "Welt der Arbeit," Chinese civil and military officials "seek to buy modern Western machinery, electronic equipment and weapons systems from tractors to jet fighters, and their political phraseology is accordingly growing more and more Western in style." The Western press expects Chinese contracts to a tune of 30 to 40 thousand million dollars.

The negative influence of the alliance between Maoism and imperialism can be seen in the increasingly arrogant US and NATO interference in the affairs of other countries. A look back to crisis periods in different parts of the world during the past two decades reveals that Peking has always sided with imperialists and reactionaries and sought to aggravate the situation. It did so in the Middle East, Chile, the Caribbean, Angola, the Horn of Africa and other regions. Today Peking openly coordinates its subversive activities against Afghanistan with Washington, trains bands of mercenaries and sends them to the territory of that sovereign state, while the "Renmin ribao" and other Maoist periodicals describe this as "acts in defence of freedom and independence."

It becomes evident that Peking and Washington, like some of their NATO allies, are developing a certain political and military mechanism for coordinating their decisions on critical international problems. Facts prove this. Shortly after Deng Xiaoping's visit to the USA and his talks with top American officials, China launched a brazen war of aggression against Vietnam, while Harold

Brown's trip to Peking precipitated increased US-Chinese subversive actions against Afghanistan. One can cite a lot more examples, and all of them, as the French daily "Monde" points out, lead to the conclusion that China and the United States, and NATO for that matter, have established relationships very similar to those of a military alliance. Even in the field of ideology they display a perfect team spirit, waging a regular psychological war against the Soviet Union.

The antagonism of Maoists and imperialist reactionaries towards détente seriously undermines international stability and brings a repetition of many cold war phenomena. Their deal testifies that the Maoists have shifted further to the right. Their alliance, however informal, is in fact politically and ideologically a counter-revolutionary move leading to direct cooperation of the Maoists with imperialism.

This dangerous turn in the rapprochement of the most reactionary forces of our times is given an ideological camouflage by the Maoist and imperialist propaganda machines. But even the most skilled psychological war experts cannot shake the convictions of the Soviet people concerning the world around them. The communist ideals and unshakable assurance in the victory of social justice and revolutionary ideals will stand any test.

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MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

REVIEW OF BOOK ON WORLD WAR II BREAKTHROUGH OPERATIONS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 54-55

[Review of the book "Proryv (Breakthrough)" authored by Army Gen A. I. Radziyevsky (Radziyevskiy). Reviewer: Lt Gen V. Semenchenko, honored scientist of the RSFSR, D. Sc. (Military), professor]

[Text]

"Breakthrough" * is the title of a book by Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army A. I. Radziyevsky. During the Great Patriotic War he covered a combat road from chief of staff of a cavalry division to commander of a tank army. After the war Radziyevsky served in different command posts. He was Deputy Chief of the General Staff Academy and from July 1969 to February 1978 headed the M. V. Frunze Military Academy; many years of his life were devoted to military scientific work.

The author, using material of the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defence, military-historical works, reminiscences of war veterans and his own experience, elucidates one of the most important questions of military art — a breakthrough of defences. The book systematises and thoroughly generalises the experience of combat actions by the forces of the Soviet Army in the breakthrough of enemy

defences during the Great Patriotic War and draws interesting conclusions concerning the art of organising and carrying out a breakthrough. Many of these are still important in modern conditions.

The material is expounded in chronological order according to the periods of the war and in each period according to the campaigns. The book deals with only the most characteristic operations. As a result, the reader is able to follow the development of the theory and practice of a breakthrough of enemy defences. The book is well illustrated. It contains coloured illustrations of many offensive operations and analyses data on the strength of strike groupings, breakthrough sectors, density of manpower and equipment, speed of breakthrough and its development in depth.

A breakthrough, as a method of offensive operations, began to be used with the appearance of mass armies, the formation of continuous front lines, and the successful development of weapons and equipment, particularly engineer equip-

ment. The warring sides experienced the necessity of a breakthrough of defences for the first time in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, but owing to the novelty of the problem and heavy losses in frontal attacks, the attempt of both sides to carry out a breakthrough failed.

Nor was the problem of a breakthrough of enemy defences on an operational scale solved during the First World War and that led the bourgeois military theoretical thought to the concept of so-called stabilised deadlock.

The author convincingly proves that this task was brilliantly solved by the Soviet military art. Already during the Civil War, when cavalry armies were formed, the Soviet forces succeeded in a number of operations in breaking through the enemy defences and exploiting success in great depth.

Generalisation of the experience of the First World War and the Civil War and the growing capabilities of the means of armed struggle allowed Soviet military art to create in 1920s a new theory of a breakthrough of organised enemy

* A. Radziyevsky, "Breakthrough" (On the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45), Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1978, 311 pp.

defences — the theory of deep offensive operation, the main principles of which were tested out during numerous exercises and manoeuvres in the prewar years and officially consolidated in the manuals and regulations.

The essence of a deep offensive operation consisted in simultaneous neutralisation of the enemy defences in the entire depth, in a breakthrough of their tactical zone in the chosen direction with subsequent rapid development of the tactical success by operational commitment to battle of tanks, motorised infantry, cavalry and air landings.

The elaboration of the theory of a deep offensive operation was an outstanding achievement of Soviet military art. It showed the way out of the dead-lock.

The Great Patriotic War proved to be a stern test of all prewar theoretical views, principles and conclusions, many of which had to be specified, considered or formulated anew, proceeding from the practice of combat operations by the Soviet Army. At the same time, as the book convincingly shows, the experience of the war proved that the views of the Soviet Command on the breakthrough of enemy defences were, in the main, correct.

The book throws light on the measures of the Supreme Command GHQ for improving the theory and practice of a breakthrough. Thus on January 10, 1942, GHQ sent a directive letter to the forces pointing out that in order to break through enemy defences it was necessary to operate with strike groupings of armies consisting of 3-4 divisions and fronts consisting of several armies aimed in one direction. Artillery preparation was replaced by artillery attack. The concentration of guns and mortars had to be 60-80 per km of frontage on sectors of actions by the armies' strike groupings and 150-200 for front strike groupings.

Compliance by the forces with the directive letter of GHQ, and other instructions and directives caused a sharp change in the pre-

paration for and carrying out of a breakthrough.

This was made possible by the selfless labour of the Soviet people and the measures taken by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government to mobilise material and manpower resources. In 1942 the production of weapons and combat equipment was considerably increased and this allowed the technical capabilities of the Soviet Army in deep offensive operations to be significantly enhanced by the end of the year.

Generalising the experience of the Soviet forces in breaking through defences, the author points out that by the end of the first period of the war there was a marked tendency to mass manpower and equipment on breakthrough sectors. The neutralisation of enemy defences by artillery and aviation was more reliable and tank density increased. Breakthrough speeds were raised, the reliability of a tactical breakthrough being developed into an operational one by mobile groups, second echelons and reserves being committed to battle became stronger.

Analysing the actions of the Soviet Army in the breakthrough of enemy defences during the second period of the war (November 1942-43) the author pays great attention to the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad and Kursk.

In the course of these and other operations during the second period of the war the theory and practice of a breakthrough were further developed. Despite the fact that the enemy assumed a deep positional defence, many operations of the Soviet forces were successful. This was achieved by correct choice of the directions of the main blows, resolute massing of manpower and equipment on breakthrough sectors, use of surprise, competent employment of artillery, aviation and tank forces, and skilful use of tactical and operational echelons, mobile groups of armies and fronts for exploiting success.

The increased power of the strike

groupings, the improved organisation and carrying out of the breakthrough made it possible, as the author stresses, to increase the proportion of successful breakthroughs to 70 per cent during the second stage of the war.

During the third stage of the Great Patriotic War (1944-45) the skill of the Soviet forces who carried out a number of brilliant offensive operations for encircling and destroying large enemy groupings which resulted in the defeat of Nazi Germany was most vividly manifested. Among such operations mention should be made above all of the operation "Bagration" * during which the Soviet forces broke through previously organised and heavily fortified enemy defences on a wide frontage. During the operation 17 divisions and 3 brigades out of the enemy's 97 divisions and 13 brigades were completely destroyed while 80 divisions lost over 50 per cent of their strength.

Success in breaking through the defences of the fiercely resisting enemy was achieved by powerful frontal blows in greater depth by several cooperating fronts. Each front broke through on the main line of advance by the effort of three-four and sometimes five armies. And breakthrough took a different form each time according to the conditions of the situation and the character of combat operations.

The Soviet Army's combat operations during the Great Patriotic War, the author stresses, enriched Soviet military art with invaluable experience in the skilful use of all fighting services and arms by whose common efforts victory was won. It is this invaluable experience that the author skilfully generalises in his book.

The author succeeds, on the whole, in revealing convincingly, fully and comprehensively for the reader, one of the most important problems of military art — the breakthrough of enemy defences.

* See "Soviet Military Review," No. 6, 1970, pp. 6-8.

ARMED FORCES

BALTIC M.D. COMMANDER ON OFFICER TRAINING

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 2-5

[Article by Army Gen A. Mayorov, commander of the Baltic M.D.: "Officer Training System"]

[Text]

The Baltic Military District was formed in summer 1940. Since it was founded forty years ago it has added many distinguished feats to its credit. It has now been awarded the Order of the Red Banner for its contribution to the defence capacity and armed defence of the Soviet state, its achievements in combat training and political education.

Officers play a big role in the fulfillment of the tasks confronting the forces of the district. They organise the instruction process. The article below by General of the Army A. M. Mayorov, military district commander, is devoted to officer training. This issue carries other material on the training and duties of the Baltic Military District personnel.

Alexander Mikhalevich MAYOROV started to serve in the Soviet Army in 1940. He took part in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. He fought on the Voronezh, Western, 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts. He participated in battles for the liberation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. After the war he held a whole range of posts from battalion commander to commander of a military district. General of the Army A. M. Mayorov is an alternate member of the CPSU Central Committee, deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. He has been awarded many Soviet and foreign Orders and medals.

OFFICERS PLAY a special role in the training and education of servicemen. They train their subordinates, lead them to battle and display concern for their welfare. If an officer is well equipped with general scientific, military, technical and political knowledge, if he is well versed in the principles of battle organisation and is skilled in the employment of weapons and other combat equipment, his men will enjoy success in battle. Addressing the 25th Congress of the CPSU Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said:

"The modern leader must organically combine within himself the Party approach and well-grounded competence, a sense of high discipline and initiative, and a creative approach to his work."

This requirement of the Party, the concern for combining lofty political consciousness of the officers with sound professional training forms the basis of officer training.

A streamlined officer training system has taken shape in the Soviet Armed Forces. It meets mo-

dern requirements. It is carried out at assemblies, troop and staff exercises, lessons in methods, group drills, tactical briefings and other forms of study. The themes are selected proceeding from an analysis of the officers' knowledge and experience and the training missions assigned for the year. It also takes into account the prospects of development of combat equipment and weapons, and achievements in military art and training methods.

Modern warfare makes much higher demands on the servicemen than in the past. Such factors as high speed of advance, the possibility of employment of nuclear weapons, the complex nature of missions and the rapid development of combat operations impose tremendous mental and physical stress on the personnel. Only men who have sound ideological, political, psychological and professional training can stand up to such stress.

V. I. Lenin formulated the law that victory in war depends on the "spirit animating the masses that spill their own blood on the field of battle." This law obliges the commanders, political workers and all officers in general to make provision for a system of measures to ensure ideological steeling, moulding of high moral, political, psychological and combat qualities in the men. To this end the officer himself should be competent in the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist theory. Knowledge of this theory is the key to correct understanding of the essential elements of the processes developing in the forces. Sound ideological convictions form the basis of the unbending will, courage, staunchness and other qualities without which victory is inconceivable in modern battle. In addition to ideological convictions, the officer should be equipped with knowledge in a wide range of fields; he should be highly competent in the methods of fighting the enemy and in effective use of weapons and other equipment, must be well acquainted with the particular features of modern combat, be able to take a sound decision and control the troops in fulfilment of the missions assigned to his subunit.

Therefore, field training plays a big role in the system of officer training. And tactics forms the core of officer field training. It has always occupied a leading place in the training of troops. The higher the officers' level of tactical art, the more tactical devices they have mastered the greater are the chances of victory in battle. It is not fortuitous that a considerable part of the total training time is allocated to tactical training (in theory and practice). The emphasis is, however, on practical training.

The lectures, seminars and individual studies of officers are devoted to the fundamentals of all-arms combat to broaden their tactical horizons.

In the field the officers improve their skills in organising battle on the ground, they learn to assess a difficult rapidly developing situation, to adopt the most expedient decisions in a brief time, to control subunits in pursuit of combat missions, or in critical situations. No lessons in theory will provide an officer with skill in organising a battle. His skill is acquired in field exercises. Take, for instance, organisation of cooperation of troops and weapons in battle. This is one of the most important elements in the work of a commander and it imposes special responsibilities on him. Today units of various fighting services and arms take part in combat operations. It is not at all easy to coordinate their efforts as regards missions, direction, lines, methods of action and time. The art of commanding consists in correct determination of the decisive role played by one subunit or unit or another in the battle formation in the direction of the main effort and in skillful employment of the other troops and weapons for achieving general success.

Mastering this art calls for all-out effort, persistence and time. If we refer to the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, we shall see that, even in the most difficult period, Soviet officers put a lot of effort into practical study. The skill obtained in it justified the effort a hundred-fold in battle.

In speaking of practical training of troops for combat Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky said that the results could not always be assessed exactly. However, one thing left no room for doubt, namely that training helped save many precious lives and contributed to the effectiveness of the offensive spirit of the troops.

The present requirements for the combat training of troops, especially of command personnel, are much higher, above all as regards the level of field training. That is why the Baltic Military District pays special attention to the forms and methods of training which develop in the officers tactical thinking, the ability to organise combat in minimum time and effect control of units and subunits during battle.

Group exercises and tactical briefings are effective forms of officer training. As a rule, they are conducted on the ground with the use of communication means to represent friendly troops and simulate enemy actions. Major V. Borzykh

experience in the conduct of such exercises is instructive. He thoroughly prepares for field exercises and sees to it that all the necessary material support is provided. Proceeding from the tactical intention he deals with practical control of the layout of training targets and means of simulation, and prescribes the sequence of work on questions of training.

As a good tactician he estimates the situation quickly and correctly, adopts a bold decision and also predicts the further development of events. He provides for measures enabling him to carry out the mission effectively.

In this connection I cannot help recalling an episode that occurred at an exercise. In the course of an attack the battalion under Guards Captain (then Senior Lieutenant) V. Susikov was ordered to repel a counterattack of approaching "enemy" reserves. The situation seemed to suggest that the battalion should organise a defence position with a fire system on the line it had reached. In fact some of the commanders thought that this was the most suitable decision because the counterattack could take place at any moment.

However, the battalion commander refused to take such a course of action. Having carefully weighed the intelligence data on the "enemy" and appraised the possibilities offered by the ground he arrived at the conclusion that it would be disadvantageous to beat off the counterattack on this line. The limited field of view and fire interfered with the organisation of the fire system and bringing the fire to bear on the "enemy" while he was on the distant approaches. So Susikov decided to advance the subunit to a more advantageous line.

It should be mentioned that his decision involved a certain degree of risk, because the "enemy" was also rapidly advancing and could, therefore, have forestalled the deployment of the battalion. Despite this, the decision was well founded, because it was based on accurate calculations taking into account the "enemy's" and his own subunit's possibilities. A well-organised reconnaissance made a substantial contribution to the senior lieutenant's correct decision. Having assigned his subordinates clear-cut missions the battalion commander organised cooperation with his neighbours and control over the actions of the subunits. They quickly advanced to the new line and organised a fire system. This enabled the battalion to engage the "enemy" with fire and then to complete his defeat in close co-operation with the neighbours.

I have examined this case in detail on purpose. Susikov's competent and resolute actions revealed his professional level, broad tactical outlook, ability to respond quickly to all the changes in the situation and to control the situation in the most difficult conditions.

The constant development of weapons and other combat equipment, and improvement of methods of their employment in combat compel officers to raise the level of their military and technical knowledge and to study the reciprocal influence of equipment and tactics. It follows that the next vital element in the officer training system is military-technical training.

Military-technical training gives the officers profound knowledge of their weapons and other combat equipment, the combat capabilities of attached and supporting subunits. We want every commander to achieve top proficiency in the handling and employment of his weapons and combat equipment, to improve his special skills, to be able to assign missions competently to sub-units in combat and make maximum use of their combat capabilities.

The number of officers with a thorough technical training is increasing every year. They set an example to the others in mastery of weaponry and other equipment. Such officers are capable of teaching the personnel to hit their targets accurately under any conditions, to operate vehicles at high speeds, i. e. to get maximum performance out of their weapons and other equipment.

The artillery battalion under Major A. Kovalyov has accumulated positive experience in technical training. The commanding officer is a competent technician, a skilled organiser well-versed in methods of instruction.

The technical training of the officers in the battalion is concentrated on learning to hit the target with the first shot at maximum range, to forestall enemy fire and to manoeuvre skilfully on the battlefield. Thus, technical training is subordinated to the interests of all-arms combat and is designed to raise the level of field training.

Another important element in officer training is development of the officers' skill in methods. Here special attention is paid to methods in tactical and technical training.

At methods conferences the officers are acquainted with the most effective methods of instruction, advanced methods for organising and conducting lessons and drills. Demonstration lessons in methods of instruction, conferences on exchange of experience in instruction and methods, and instructive analysis of exercises and lessons have proved highly useful.

In our military district there are many officers who are expert in training methods. The Lettish Rifles Guards Motorised Infantry Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel I. Kiekta has trained many competent methods instructors.

The staff of this unit pay serious attention to planning the training of officers in methods. The officers are required to conduct regular lessons in methods of instruction, demonstration lessons and briefings. The purpose of these lessons is to secure maximum effective results in the presentation of programme material to the personnel and provide unified instruction on concrete themes. The staff attach special importance to a comprehensive study of various disciplines together with tactical training, to the creation of a competitive spirit in work on missions and training standards and competent use of training facilities. It is not fortuitous that many officers of this unit, including young ones, have mastered advanced methods in training proficient specialists.

I have dealt only with the fundamental questions of officer training. The demands on its organisation are very broad, because the professional level of officers is characterised not merely by knowledge, but also by a set of skills, organisational abilities and will power.

Proceeding from the above we can draw the conclusion that a high ideological and theoretical level, tactical thinking, technical proficiency and organisational ability form the essential components of a commander's professional competence in peacetime and of achievement of victory in war.

That is why the military council of the military district displays concern for constant improvement of officer training in keeping with the growing requirements of modern warfare.

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ARMED FORCES

DEVELOPING WILL POWER IN COMBAT PERSONNEL

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 34-35

[Article by Lt Col V. Bogdanovsky (Bogdanovskiy): "Steeling the Will"]

[Text]

In 1943 the nazis with the despair of the doomed were trying to hold up the advance of the Soviet forces and to prevent them from crossing the Dnieper. However, there was no force that could possibly halt the Soviet drive westward.

Artillerymen were courageously fighting on a sector of the front. The subunit under Captain V. Petrov was the first in the brigade to cross over with its guns to the west bank of the Dnieper, where it repulsed continuous enemy counter-attacks for many hours.

The positions of Soviet artillerymen were shelled and mortared. Their ranks were dwindling. When one of the guns stopped firing Captain V. Petrov took over as gunlayer and shot up four tanks and a self-propelled assault gun. Then as he tried to save a comrade he himself was severely wounded. The doctors saved his life, but Captain Petrov lost both his hands.

The war seemed to be over for him. How could one fight with no hands? But Petrov set himself the aim of remaining in the fighting ranks. Finally, he was back with his men. He fought bravely. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was twice conferred on him. He also became a general.

After the war Petrov did not retire. He began to educate young soldiers and to make them skillful artillerymen. He had to study himself to master new models of weapons and combat equipment. He defended a scientific thesis for the degree of Candidate of Science (Military) at the M. I. Kalinin Artillery Academy in Leningrad.

Today Lieutenant-General Petrov is Deputy Chief of the Rocket Forces and Artillery of the

Order of the Red Banner Cis-Carpathian Military District. Despite great pressure of work, he takes an active part in social and military-patriotic activities. He has published two books of war memoirs and reminiscences about his wartime comrades. His strong will helps him cope with his duties and overcome the difficulties he encounters.

What is will power?

Will power is a man's ability to control his behaviour, to mobilise his energy for surmounting the difficulties standing in the way of achieving his goal.

Will power is tremendously important in war. In battle victory goes to the man who is brave, resolute and has a strong will. In present day combat the demand on a man's emotional stability and will power have become much greater. Scientific and technological progress has transformed military labour. This now includes most complicated elements of intellectual labour and creativity. In addition, the introduction of mainly crew served weapons into the forces has increased the scale and the complexity of cooperation among the men. These new features set new criteria for the appraisal of training of the will both in individual soldiers and in military collectives as a whole.

Will power does not exist by itself. It is manifested in personal qualities, especially such qualities as purposefulness. In modern rapidly developing combat a man's immediate and resolute action may play an exceptionally great role in achieving success.

Such elements as energy, persistence, poise, self-control, conscientiousness, discipline, initiative and self-reliance are important for the entire make-up of will power.

Ideological motives form the basis of all acts of soldiers, including volitional acts. The Soviet soldier's will power is strengthened by the knowledge that he is guarding the constructive labour of his people, guarding peace.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) shows that men with a strong will stood up to the stress of battle against the Nazi invaders and were immune to panic. To maintain the will for victory it is necessary to develop in the men the ability to summon up all energy to their efforts to overcome difficulties.

Combat training is the most effective method for accomplishing this task. Actions in unexpected situations, driving tanks underwater, inurement to tank assaults, and teaching the men to negotiate obstacles develop in the men the ability to control themselves under difficult conditions and to be calm in face of danger.

For instance, the units and subunits of the Cis-Carpathian Military District have created special grounds and training fields which help the men enhance their will. The men practise in "live" obstacle courses outfitted with means simulating explosions, shots and the noises of battle. The men are trained in fields with artificial obstacles, such as demolished façades of brick buildings, semi-destroyed bridges, slashings, etc. and on difficult ground including mountainous, marshy and broken terrain.

At one drill, I saw a young soldier break into a blazing house for the first time to fight on the upper floors. At first he was a bit confused: it takes courage to force oneself to run into a house through a wall of flames. But finally he forced himself to enter. The staircases and ceilings were burning and clouds of pungent smoke made breathing difficult and hindered orientation. But the soldier stubbornly made his way forward, each step adding to his confidence. When the drill was repeated he acted with daring and resolve.

At tactical exercises commanders try to create a situation which teaches the men to overcome hesitation and fear and develops emotional stability and will.

Another drill I saw consisted in an engagement with a tank. Yefreitor I. Maximov and Private A. Galko were in a trench. A tank was heading towards them. The tank closed in, the time seemed to have come to open fire at it. But the men were

in no hurry to do so. They decided to make sure of a hit. Suddenly the tank plunged into a deep ditch. As it crawled out Yefreitor Maximov smoothly pulled the trigger of the antitank rocket launcher. In real combat the tank would have been disabled. But this was an exercise and the AFV continued to move. The men hurled several anti-tank grenades under its tracks. Then suddenly it became dark in the trench. The tank was passing over the men's heads. The men hurled grenades at the tank again, this time at its rear. As the tank was turning the men changed their position. As soon as the AFV reached them the men skillfully dragged under the track a mine tied to a cord. An "explosion" followed.

After that Maximov and Galko fought the tank on open ground. They learnt the art of concealment and of misleading the tank crew as to their intentions. Posing as dead soldiers they lay motionless on the ground while the tank approached them. Just at the right moment they changed their position to place themselves between the tracks of the tank. Such drills develop the men's will as well as poise and self-control.

The officer's individual work and knowledge of his men's characters are highly important in developing their will power. He must know what makes up a man's needs, the motives behind his behaviour and the principles he lives by. The officer's knowledge of his men is the key to success in educating them.

Commanders and political workers play a leading role in developing the men's will. Superiors displaying initiative, resolve and daring enjoy prestige among their subordinates and exercise influence on them. However, it should be borne in mind that the soldier's personality is moulded in practical activity with other servicemen. The collective by its very existence predetermines and programmes the system of actions of all its members, sets examples of appropriate behaviour and gives an ethical appraisal of every act. That is why commanders and political workers pay special attention to problems of the men's interaction and mutual influence within the framework of their joint activity. The Party organisation, which forms the core of the military collective, gives careful thought to the pedagogical purpose of such mutual influence.

The steeling of the will is the result of concerted efforts by commanders, the collective and the man himself in the process of self-education. Self-education of the will is a man's conscious desire to improve his military and political knowledge and combat skills, and to enhance his readiness to surmount difficulties. The man above all sets

himself the aim of becoming an excellent soldier, improving his proficiency, mastering a related speciality (for interchangeability in battle). After that he persistently works to realise his aim.

Military service is not easy. A man has to strain every effort, to curb his desires, needs and interests. The man must above all himself realise this and display a firm will in his actions.

The strict military routine helps mould will power. It teaches the men to be accurate, meticulous and concentrated.

Step by step a man acquires the habit of displaying will in his behaviour: he first learns to jump over a trench and then to jump from a plane with a parachute, to hit the bull's eye with his submachine gun, to hurl a live grenade, to crawl and finally to engage the "enemy" in obstacle courses with simulated battle noises.

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ARMED FORCES

EDUCATIONAL ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 80 pp 8-10

[Article by Major-General N. Gusev, cand. sc. (Philosophy): "Developing the Personality in the Army"]

[Text]

The Soviet Armed Forces, being a new military organisation of a socialist type, have always played an important part in the Soviet people's life and in their communist education. The army's role as a school of patriotism and internationalism is determined by such factors as its socio-political nature and great social significance, perfect technical equipment, servicemen's high qualification in their military trade and the complex Party-political work aimed at forming in them a scientific outlook based on the Marxist-Leninist teaching and an active stand in life. Influenced by these factors the young men inexperienced in politics and lacking the necessary skill in labour, become politically and morally mature and ready to defend their country.

The army of a socialist state reflects the socialist social relations that have taken shape in that state. The army's life, its routine, the training and education of servicemen, their mutual relations and attitude towards the people are all based on socialist principles and are for the youth a school of life and education. The experience gained by the men in the forces enables them to acquire a sound knowledge of military science and subsequently to occupy a worthy place in the field of creative labour and socio-political activity of their people. In his report to the 25th CPSU Congress L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said:

"The young men who join the army have no experience in life. But they return from the army with schooling in self-control and discipline, and with technical and vocational knowledge and political training."

The whole history of the Soviet Armed Forces testifies to the fact that they have always been and still are a school of communist education in all its aspects. By instilling socialist ideas into the servicemen's mind, developing their new attitude towards labour and social property, steeling their will and character, educating them in the spirit of collectivism and by raising their socio-political activity, educational and cultural level the army and the navy contribute enormously to the education of the new man, the socialist personality.

The political bodies and Party organisations functioning in the army, firmly and consistently pursue the Party policy from day to day in military collectives. The servicemen have the opportunity to attend different mass organisations operating in the army such as youth, sports, military scientific, military technical, etc. They enjoy in full all the rights and freedoms laid down in the Constitution for the citizens of socialist society including the right to elect and be elected to all the bodies of state authority and administration. Today 56 servicemen are deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet, 157 and 39 to the Supreme Soviets of Union and Autonomous Republics respectively and more than 13,000 servicemen to the Local Soviets of People's Deputies.

The Soviet Army's great merit is that it plays a great role in further developing the men's scientific outlook, the foundation of which was laid in their school years. However, as distinct from school, in a military collective the man's standpoint is developed in the course of his training and education in organic unity with his daily practical work.

The men's scientific outlook is formed under the influence of the ideological work based on the Marxist-Leninist theory. The ideological and political education of servicemen is a continuous, regular and purposeful process carried out intensively and actively.

As a result, in a military collective the men take less time to become politically and ideologically mature and capable of making a sober assessment of events both at home and abroad. As a result, they begin to take more interest in politics and their views undergo substantial positive changes as regards their attitude towards life, labour and military service.

In the army the men become deeply aware of the necessity to work conscientiously to be worthy builders of communist society. The army personnel are taught and trained to observe discipline strictly, show initiative and creative approach to their tasks, to work with great efficiency and take care of socialist property. The soldier's duty and military discipline develop in the men a sense of responsibility for the mission assigned and raise their conscientiousness and persistence making them more exacting to themselves and ready to overcome any difficulties. When their term of service has expired, servicemen not infrequently continue to practise the speciality they have obtained in the army. After their honorary discharge they often make use of the special skills they have gained in the forces.

Military service with its strict discipline and intensive combat training (drills, lessons, exercises, flights, marches, tours of duty, servicing the most up-to-date equipment) forms in the men high moral and combat qualities. The feeling of responsibility for the fulfilment of a mission of national importance (as, for instance, keeping a ship or a unit in a state of combat readiness) elevates the man, developing in him the noble feeling of personal participation in the historic deeds of his Party and people.

The socialist emulation movement in the army and navy plays a great educational role. It is organised by commanders together with political bodies, Party and Komsomol organisations with the active participation of staffs. It arouses the servicemen's high activity, enhances their feeling of friendship and comradeship-in-arms and helps to establish in a military collective the mutual relations prescribed by the regulations.

The way of life in the army and navy promotes the men's physical development. This is ensured by the strict regulation of their work and rest and

also by their regular physical training. During the period of their service the men become strong and enduring, agile and skilful.

When in the army the servicemen broaden their cultural and educational outlook. They deepen their knowledge at the lessons held regularly in all aspects of combat training (mainly technical and special) and also during their political classes. The men's knowledge is increased and deepened and their cultural level is raised in the forces by the spreading of science and technology through the use of various methods and by the aesthetic education of the personnel. The work of this kind is carried out extensively.

Functioning in the army and navy is a streamlined system of cultural and educational institutions. They are the Central House of the Soviet Army and the Central Academic Theatre of the Soviet Army in Moscow, Officers' Houses in military districts, fleets and garrisons, Soldiers' Clubs in military units, Lenin Rooms in companies and Lenin Cabins on ships. Soldiers' Clubs are provided with cinema halls, libraries, gymnasiums and sports grounds in the open air. In garrisons the servicemen can attend cinemas, clubs, sports grounds, swimming pools and specially equipped places where they can spend their free time. According to the Interior Service Regulations the men can participate at the appropriate time in sports competitions, go to the theatre or attend musical, dancing, literary and technical circles or youth clubs. They can also spend their leisure time in a cosy Soldiers' Tea House (café) or go outside their unit lines when on leave.

Soviet servicemen are avid readers, the army and navy book stock exceeding 116 million volumes. Readers' conferences are regularly practised in military collectives.

The men can familiarise themselves with the central and local press by visiting Lenin Rooms (Cabins) available in each company and analogous subunits. Besides the "Krasnaya Zvezda" newspaper, the central organ of the USSR Ministry of Defence, the army is supplied with more than 10 military magazines and 26 local newspapers (published in military districts, groups of forces and fleets). Each military unit has cinematographic equipment (stationary and mobile), a broadcasting centre and TV sets. In recent years the number of radio and TV sets in the forces has increased 3 and 10 times respectively. In the Officers' Houses there are regular performances of

song and dance ensembles, amateur theatres and other amateur art collectives. Professional artists patronising the army also frequently visit the forces to perform to them.

A bourgeois army, owing to its class, antagonistic nature cannot promote the progressive development of youth. Although it undoubtedly has an effect on moulding the personality, this is done first and foremost by the ideological indoctrination of army personnel consisting mostly in positive misinformation. The bourgeoisie resorts to such indoctrination in order to turn soldiers representing the working people into their obedient servants. In imperialist armies the men's mind is distorted and obscured by false ideas.

The massive ideological and psychological influence a bourgeois army has on the personality continues after the men's discharge. It is no mere chance that some criminals, according to the American press, explain their acts of violence and murders by the fact that they acquired a "taste" for it in the army.

Having been steeled in the army Soviet young men return to their civil life to rightfully occupy leading places at the enterprise where they work and to be worthy members of society. They usually actively participate in social life and enjoy respect and prestige among their colleagues.

In the conditions of developed socialism and in the course of communist construction, society imposes ever increasing demands on moulding the personality, including that of servicemen. A decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Educational Work" sets the Soviet Armed Forces the important task to enhance their educational role. The implementation of this task set by the Party implies the utmost use of all the potentialities of educational work, steady application of a comprehensive method and extending the content of ideological work in order to meet youth's spiritual interests, raise their level of combat training and political education and strengthen the unity of the army and the people.

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ARMED FORCES

AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OPERATION DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 80 pp 16-17

(Article by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Narayhkin: "Cooperation in a Seaborne Landing")

(Text)

A seaborne landing force must show great skill to land on a sea-coast occupied by the enemy who, making use of his advantageous position, has located his men and weapons in such a way as to bar the likely routes of advance of any landing force and prevent its gaining a foothold. Therefore, to break down enemy resistance, a landing force (even tactical) and above all the first assault detachment must be composed of various types of forces and weapons. Of particular importance is the commander's ability to make skillful use of their subunits and maintain close cooperation between them. This was proved in the Great Patriotic War. Recalling the landing on Malaya Zemlya L. I. Brezhnev wrote: "...when we seized the beachhead, the fascists bombed and shelled it relentlessly, showering a tremendous barrage of shells and bombs, not to mention submachine- and machine-gun fire, down upon us. It was calculated that there were 1,250 kilograms of lethal metal for every Malaya Zemlya defender." Encountering such a fierce resistance, "the successful landing by the first assault detachment," he went on, "the operative troop build-up and the advance of the regiments and corps along a well-fortified and mined shore — all demanded clockwork coordination of infantry, engineer units, sailors and artillery."

Nowadays, too, cooperation is still a condition of success for a landing on the coast. But it is no simple task to organise it, taking fully into account all the peculiarities of the operation in order to coordinate the efforts of all the forces engaged from the point of view of tasks, positions, time and lines of advance. Hence the careful attention devoted to these points. This can be illustrated by the way a battalion commander organised cooperation during a tactical exercise.

A motorised infantry battalion detailed to operate as advanced detachment was reinforced with an artillery battery, an ATGM battery, AA. frogman and engineer platoons. It also included reconnaissance and obstacle-clearing parties, road-building teams, communication facilities, transport vehicles, and landing craft to perform transportation missions. The advanced detachment was to be supported by aviation, tactical airborne troops, support ships and mine sweepers.

Since the purpose of the operation was to land a motorised infantry battalion, the commander of this battalion was in charge of organising cooperation.

The outcome of the operation depended largely on the commander's ability to understand every detail of the senior commander's concept and to have a clear idea of the actions of the landing force and the first assault detachment in strict compliance with the concept. When setting missions to his subordinates the Bn CO had to bring to their knowledge his decision on cooperation and, during subsequent preparations, he had to elaborate down to the smallest details the priority of actions for the embarkation of men and material, the sea passage and, what is most important, during the landing and fighting on the beach.

Skill in carrying out landing operations does not come overnight. Neither the Bn CO nor his subordinates had such experience and therefore they had to undergo thorough and painstaking training before the exercise. They began by studying the relevant regulations and manuals on seaborne landing operations, familiarising themselves with the experience of the last war and past tactical exercises. As a result, they were able to instruct the men in all the actions for embarking and loading the material, for the sea passage and for disembarking at a depth of 0.5-0.75 m and on the beach.

Training was conducted on a sector of terrain with a water feature for practice in manning landing craft. The place was also equipped with a dummy landing craft ramp

and an embarkation point. Before the exercise the battalion trained jointly with a naval force using various landing craft to achieve skill in embarkation.

As a result, the battalion subunits were able to operate in concert with the landing craft's crews. On the Bn CO's order each company, instead of embarking its vehicles one by one in forward gear, made a manoeuvre to bring the tail of the column up to the ramp. Then the vehicle commanders dismounted and loading was carried out by backing the whole column up the ramp simultaneously. Thus, both in the waiting area and en route towards the landing points the battalion maintained the route formation corresponding to the order of landing the material and entering battle.

During the exercise the Bn CO took a creative approach to organising embarkation. For instance, on his order the subunits, using the manpower and equipment loading plan as a basis, drew diagrams showing the location of the force on the landing craft. Although it did not take long to make these diagrams, they considerably helped the commanders, driver-mechanics and vehicle crews to know exactly the location of their combat equipment on the landing craft and also to adhere strictly to the embarkation procedure.

Thorough preparations enabled the landing force to show team-work and thus to reduce the time of embarkation. The naval forces coped successfully with their missions of transporting the force, landing it exactly at the appointed time and the specified place and neutralising by fire the "enemy" antilanding defence.

During the landing the infantry operated in concert and maintained close cooperation with the tactical airborne force, aviation and obstacle-clearing parties. Road-building teams were used most effectively. As a result, disembarkation was carried out without a hitch. Despite the fact that the situation was difficult the infantrymen showed perfect organisation when disembarking their equipment and engaging the "enemy" on the march. The latter did his utmost to prevent the battalion's landing. Should any sub-unit have been even minutes too late in leaving the ship, this might have led to a concentration of equipment in the landing place under "enemy" fire or to the delay in assuming battle formation. Under these circumstances the battalion might have suffered heavy losses, failed to capture the strong point in time or sacrificed surprise.

Thanks to its well-organised cooperation the battalion was able to deliver a decisive and swift attack. The commanders showed initiative and skill in manoeuvring with forces and weapons and launching flank and rear attacks. After taking up firing positions the artillery attached to the battalion gave it a reliable support.

Such a skillful coordination of efforts made it possible for the landing force to score a success. The exercise proved once more the great importance of cooperation in landing and engaging the enemy ashore.

The Bn CO and his staff lost no time in organising co-operation. This was due above all to their correct choice of main objectives and concentration of the main efforts on them. In particular, they spent much time on the problem of ensuring cooperation during landing and "lighting" on the coast. The advanced detachment mastered its landing technique on terrain closely resembling that of the landing points. As a result of the joint training of all the force during the landing, breaching and negotiating obstacles the subunit commanders of the amphibious force ascertained in detail the landing procedure and thus were ready to fulfil their combat mission. The emphasis was placed on concerted action of the advanced detachment and tactical airborne troops detailed for its support.

In addition, the Bn CO worked up cooperation on a terrain mock-up of the land and sea area of the landing point. First the landing technique was mastered in favourable conditions, i.e. using the surprise factor with "enemy" antilanding defence neutralised, a smooth sea, successful landing of tactical airborne troops, etc. Then he changed to a landing in unfavourable conditions.

The landing technique was mastered by playing several variants of each combat episode in the appropriate tactical situation. This training method enabled the Bn CO to establish what ideas his subordinates had of the forthcoming action, in what detail they had studied their own tasks and those of the attached forces including control signals.

Then the advanced detachment commander took his decision on cooperation and informed the company commanders of it. This thorough preparation for the exercise produced positive results: despite a difficult and sharply changing situation the landing force operated in an orderly manner at all stages of the tactical exercise.

During the exercise every man and crew showed good knowledge of their own missions and those confronting the appropriate subunit, support forces and neighbours, knowing perfectly what was to be done in various situations. The commanders also showed proficiency in troop control.

[See photo on following page]



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AIR FORCES

INTERCEPTING LOW-SPEED AIR TARGETS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 21-23

[Article by Lt Col G. Dovgalyonok, military pilot 1st Class: "Intercepting Low-Speed Targets"]

[Text]

IN MODERN battle it is not rare that fighter planes have to deal with helicopters and other low-speed targets. Special training is needed to intercept and destroy them.

At the initial stage of training the most complicated task is working up target search skills since a low-flying helicopter is difficult to distinguish against the background of the terrain, particularly in a haze, which impairs horizontal visibility. A pilot begins to make out the general outline of a helicopter at a distance of 3-4 km; he cannot see the rotor disk or determine the direction in which the target is moving at a distance greater than 2-2.5 km.

The search may be carried out independently, by guidance from the command post or by combining both methods. Independent search is used when the target is beyond radar range or tends to approach the guarded objective at a height hampering its constant observation. CP guidance is used with stable radar visibility or when the target is observed from a reconnaissance plane. In a number of cases both search methods may be used, depending on the flight profile or the distance of the flight route from the acquisition radar; on such occasions the interceptor is guided to a certain line by the CP, and subsequently the pilot acts independently.

To attain high efficiency of independent search, air patrol zones are established with due account of likely flight directions of air targets and of the

potentials of the air defence system in the given area. The zones are arranged in such a manner that the interceptor flies on a course perpendicular to the presumed course of the target. The depth of the zone is determined on the basis of calculations, the initial data for which are the width of the area viewed by an independent fighter or group of fighters during one pass, the speed of the target and that of the fighter. Apart from the number of fighters in the group, the width of the area depends also on the type of fighter, flight altitude and horizontal visibility. In calculating the parameters of the air patrol zone, account is also taken of the fact that the fighter will have to perform 180° turns.

Correct choice of the mode and profile of the flight is an indispensable condition of search efficiency. The air situation and weather permitting, observation of the air space is best conducted with the fighter flying above the presumed flight level of the target. For complete observation of the front sector, it is necessary for the fighter to deviate from flight route. Flight conditions are selected so as to enable the pilot to attack the detected target from the run and to increase revs quickly in the event of a sudden encounter with enemy fighters.

In searching for low-altitude targets, the pilot takes account of the fact that considerable time is spent on monitoring the flying mode, orientation and determining the aircraft's bearings. Therefore,

much attention during ground training is given to selecting and working up flying modes, peculiarities of flying techniques and navigation at low altitudes, studying the flight area, typical reference points and the pilot's actions to recover the plane's bearings.

To avoid blunders in working up the techniques of searching for and attacking low-speed air targets, at the initial stage flights are performed over the aerodrome or the firing range, i.e. over terrain familiar to the pilot. The training is conducted and supervised directly by the commander.

The most typical mistake in searching for and attacking helicopters and low-speed aeroplanes is to lose visual contact with the target after detecting it. More often than not such situations arise due to mistakes in recording the target's exact location and course after detecting it. This is because some pilots tend to assume the attack position immediately upon detecting the target, without connecting it with ground reference points.

Some pilots fail to maintain the assigned or calculated banks, g-loads or dive angles when performing a manoeuvre, particularly during the first flights. As a result, they spend a large part of the time observing flight conditions and spatial orientation, and not searching for the target and keeping it constantly in sight. Besides, deviation from the predetermined parameters of a manoeuvre complicates subsequent actions, because after executing the manoeuvre the interceptor generally finds itself at a greater distance than calculated from the target.

Detecting the target again after manoeuvring to assume the attack position is one of the most responsible elements of interception. To avoid losing the target and to observe it better, it is recommended to perform variable bank or combined turns. This manoeuvre may be used to advantage when for some reason or other the first attack has failed. The turn projection on the ground is an ellipsoid with a difference between its maximum and minimum diameters equal to the distance (in metres) covered by the target during the fighter's manoeuvring time. To perform a

more accurate manoeuvre and reduce the possibility of losing visual contact with the target, the bank may be made steeper, which also shortens the manoeuvring time. Increasing the bank, however, is not always practicable because of the flight conditions (low altitude or speed).

To keep to the above attack parameters and to be able to correct the error in determining the initial range during the attack, it is desirable for the fighter to be 120 m above the target at an angle of 90°. Such a difference in height with the initial attack range of 3.5 km corresponds to dive angles of 18° to 23°, which enables the pilot to correct the mistake in determining the range by altering the dive angle within 15° to 30°.

Of primary importance for enhancing the efficiency of intercepting low-speed air targets is the pilots' systematic training to perform a search, manoeuvre or attack of ground targets. Working up piloting techniques, keeping to predetermined flight conditions and sighting methods in attacking ground targets enables them to acquire the skills necessary for such air combat. It should be borne in mind, however, that to hit ground targets with preset parameters, it is sufficient to be accurate in taking an auxiliary course and to begin the attack manoeuvre at a calculated point. This task is facilitated by the possibility for the pilot to study thoroughly the reference points in the target area during preliminary training and to calculate auxiliary courses for different tactical methods of attack.

In attacking air targets the pilot has to study a vast area without being able to give much attention to individual details of reference points, for it is impossible to determine beforehand exactly where an air battle will take place.

The principal specific features considered during pilots' training to attack low-speed targets are difficulty of search and capability of air targets to change the direction, speed and altitude of flight while the fighter manoeuvres and attacks. Moreover, it should be remembered that pilots will have to fight air battles in groups of varying composition, over different terrains, in various air, tactical and meteorological situations, by day and by night.

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GROUND FORCES

BM-21 ROCKET LAUNCHER DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 28-30

[Article by Col N. Pavlov: "BM-21 Rocket Launcher"]

[Text]

Rocket artillery is a powerful fire weapon possessing definite advantages over cannon artillery. Its rocket launchers can deliver massed fire in a very short time; it is also highly mobile and manoeuvrable on the battlefields and simple in design.

Salvo fire of rocket artillery ensures surprise, has high destructive power and a considerable demoralising effect on the enemy. For instance, a battery of BM-21 ("Grad") rocket launchers is designed to fire a salvo of up to 240 rockets in 20 seconds. Known as salvo launchers they are widely used in the land forces.

According to the experience of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) rocket launchers proved most effective when fired to destroy enemy manpower and equipment located in the open. Thus, one battle report of August 1941 said that rocket launchers "inflict heavy losses on the enemy by their massed fire seriously demoralising him and making his units flee in panic."

During the Great Patriotic War the BM-13 rocket launcher nicknamed "Katyusha" (a woman's name) was very popular in the Soviet Army. It was in the serial production soon after the war broke out.

Rocket launchers began to be designed in the middle '30s. A group of Soviet designers (V. A. Artemyev, A. G. Kostikov, I. I. Ovsi, V. N. Galkovsky) produced conventional rockets and experimental multiple rocket launchers which, after certain modifications, were indexed BM-8 and BM-13. Their


calibres were 82 mm and 132 mm, weights 8 kg and 42.5 kg and ranges were 5,500 m and 7,900 m respectively.

During the Second World War the armies of the other warring countries also began to be equipped with rocket launchers. However, Soviet rocket artillery sub-

M-21 OF unguided rocket:

A. 1 — fuse; 2 — warhead body; 3 — explosive charge; 4 — knurled metal shells

B. 1 — front powder charge; 2 — rocket unit; 3 — igniter; 4 — electric detonator; 5 — rear powder charge; 6 — stabiliser fins; 7 — lid-nozzle; 8 — guide pin



stantially exceeded them in regards both quality and quantity.

In the 1950s the Soviet Army adopted for service the new rocket launchers BM-14 (16 launching racks) and BM-24 (12 barrels) and some time later BM-20 and BM-21 ('C-31'). Their combat capabilities were further improved by increasing their range, reducing their rocket dispersion and augmenting their destructive effect. Crews operating conditions were also improved. Compared to the period of World War II the range of these rocket launchers was increased 2-2.5 times.

The BM-21 rocket launcher includes: an M-21OF unguided rocket, the rocket launcher proper, a vehicle for carrying rockets and control equipment.

The unguided rocket is the principal fighting component of the system. It consists of a warhead and a rocket section. Its mass is 66 kg, length 2.8 m and maximum range 20.4 km. On explosion the warhead produces a great fragmentation effect and shock wave.

The rocket warhead may be filled with a shaped charge, incendiary, smoke or other agents or incendiary clusters.

The M-21OF rocket warhead is provided with a nose percussion fuse. To ensure safety in handling the rocket, its fuse striker is armed only after the rocket has been launched and has flown a certain distance. In order to increase the fragmentation effect, knurled metal shells are pressed into the body of the rocket unit. The rocket body houses an explosive charge with a detonator. The rocket head is provided with a retaining ring fitted to ensure a closely-grouped fire at a range of up to 16 km.

The rocket unit accommodates a powder rocket engine and has a warhead and a stabiliser unit attached. The engine develops the thrust necessary to impart motion to the rocket in the air. The rocket engine is provided with a powder charge filled with nitroglycerine powder (20.5 kg). This powder

charge consists of two cylindrical charges with a common central vent. The powder charge is reliably secured in place with gaskets so as to prevent its longitudinal and transversal displacement. The charges are separated by an enclosed powder igniter with electric primers. The electric primers are connected by two wires to the outlet contacts of the rocket lid/nozzle.

The rear part of the rocket unit has a stabiliser unit and a guide pin fixed to it. The stabiliser unit houses the intake and exhaust cones of the rocket chamber. It is closed by a lid having seven nozzles on its perimeter. At launching the working gas begins to escape through these nozzles. Rocket rotation on its longitudinal axis improves accuracy of fire.

After the rocket has left the launching tube, its stabiliser opens and is retained in this position by springs. To achieve a steady flight and high accuracy of hits of unguided rockets, it is advisable to increase their angular velocity. Such rockets are classified as spin-stabilised projectiles.

The purpose of the BM-21 rocket launcher is to aim and launch rock-

ets. Being controlled from a cabin it can deliver both salvo and single-shot fire. Rocket launching can also be carried out from a shelter at a distance of up to 60 m.


The BM-21 is a self-propelled multiple launcher mounted on Ural-375D cross-country chassis. Its main components are launching racks with a cradle, a traversing gear, a laying device, an aiming mechanism, a base-and-frame assembly, and electrical equipment.

The rocket launcher has 40 launching racks arranged in four rows which, together with their fastenings, form a tilting part moving in the vertical plane. Each launching tube is grooved to impart a rotary motion to the rocket and furnished with a rocket arresting device and a tilt rod. After the launching tube has been loaded, the tilt rod is connected to the rocket so as to feed a current pulse to the electric primers.

The rocket launcher is also provided with a torsional balancing gear which is used to decrease the initial load exerted on the elevating gear by the tilting part (at small angles of elevation).

The tilting part of the rocket

BM-21 rocket launcher: 1 — launching racks; 2 — front support; 3 — cradle; 4 — traversing gear; 5 — base-and-frame assembly



launcher is installed on a movable base which makes it possible to turn the launching racks in the horizontal plane. The base is connected by a support ring to the main frame.

The launching racks are aimed by using the electrically-driven elevating gear and traversing gear. It takes some 10 seconds to elevate the launching racks to a maximum angle of 55°. Laying for direction is effected with a traversing gear. When using electric drive it takes not more than 14 seconds to train launching racks at an angle of 100°. Electric drives are fed from a D.C. generator rated at 5 kW. The laying device may be operated manually, which enhances the rocket launcher's readiness for use.

The BM-21 rocket launcher is equipped with sight mechanisms similar to those used by cannon artillery which allows it to be aimed both when firing from a covered position and during direct fire.

The control and launching equipment of the BM-21 includes a pulse

unit, a sequence switch, a remote launching cable drum and a cable set. This equipment is connected by cables with the tilt rods provided on the launching racks. A rocket launching program is introduced by the control devices (tumblers, buttons, switches, etc.) located on the outer side of the sequence switch.

The Ural-375 cross-country vehicle is used to carry the rockets. The vehicle body is provided with racks attached to its sides and containing 20 rockets each. The vehicle holds ammunition for a single salvo.

The accuracy of fire and the surprise effect of the rocket artillery depend on the basic firing data available as well as on weather and ballistic conditions. Thanks to the control equipment it is possible to deliver fire for effect and to prepare firing data automatically.

The BM-21 is an effective salvo launcher possessing high combat and service properties and capable of executing a great number of fire missions.

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GROUND FORCES

BM-21 ROCKET LAUNCHER MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 30-31

[Article by Col N. Nikolayev: "BM-21 Rocket Launcher Maintenance"]

[Text]

The BM-21 rocket launcher battery commanded by Senior Lieutenant Petrov was preparing for a tactical exercise with field firing. Having calculated the time remaining before the march, he ordered his men to carry out a control inspection of fighting and transport vehicles.

When inspecting vehicle running gear the crew commanders checked whether the fuel tanks, oil and cooling systems were filled up, measured the voltage of storage batteries and tyre pressure and made sure that the electrical equipment was in working order. They also checked to see that all canvas covers were intact and clean and made sure that the traversing gear and the tilting part of rocket launchers were reliably secured. While doing this they paid special attention to the condition of rocket arresting devices and launching racks and oiled all the unpainted parts. Particular attention was paid to the faultless operation of tilt rods and launching electrical equipment.

All defects and malfunctions detected were eliminated immediately. This work was performed with the active participation of specialists from the repair subunit.

When the inspection was over, the battery commander reported to

the battalion CO that he was ready to start.

During intervals between assignments at the tactical exercise the battery carried out the routine maintenance of the combat equipment. The fire platoon commanders constantly made sure that vehicles were topped up with fuel and checked the condition of vehicle running gear and rocket launching assembly. The crews cleaned their equipment, dried the canvas covers, renewed lubricants, inspected the electric drive units of laying devices and also pulse and extension cable drum transmitters.

To prepare for rocket launching the men checked the operation of the BM-21 main units, the condition of train and elevation power drives including interlocking contacts. When checking the BM-21 tilting and traversing parts at maximum angles of traversing and elevation and in the cabin clearance zone they saw to it that the red pilot lamps lit up on the control panel.

Simultaneously the crews checked the condition of sight mechanisms and launching circuits. Pulse transmitters were checked when firing both from cover and from the vehicle cabin.

Particular attention was paid to

the loading procedure. The platoon leaders brought the rocket launchers to a special ground and set them at the ready. The crew turned the launching racks to the left and at a right angle to the longitudinal axis of the rocket launchers so as to make it possible to load them from the vehicle floor.

Each rocket was loaded so that its guide pin entered the launching rack groove and then it was rammed home till the specific click of the arresting device was heard. After that the rocket launchers were brought to travelling position.

When the battery arrived at the destination Senior Lieutenant Petrov accompanied by a recce party carried out on-the-spot reconnaissance of the firing position. He specified the site for rocket launchers and the procedure for its organisation. Each rocket launcher was positioned so as to ensure a clear view of the main and alternate aiming points.

Acting in concert the crews took up the firing position on the relevant order. At the appointed time a salvo was fired and the target destroyed. The battery left its firing position and proceeded to fulfil its tactical mission.

After the exercise the battery personnel were ordered to carry

out Maintenance No. 1. The platoon commanders reminded their subordinates once more of the work they had to do in addition to the routine maintenance operations envisaged by the current servicing. The men had to check the unlocking force which may affect the rocket arresting devices, to make sure that the traversing gear movable base was reliably secured to the support ring and to check the condition of the frame assembly; they also had to determine the idling periods of laying devices, to check electric drives for operation and so on.

In organising maintenance work the platoon commanders took into account their subordinates' professional skills. Thus, crew commanders checked aiming mechanisms, the gunners laying devices and the repairmen were to check the clutch slipping force and its moment.

The crew showed high results in maintaining the BM-21 rocket launchers thanks to their work having been thoroughly thought out and well organised.

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GROUND FORCES

TANK BATTALION TRAINING METHODS

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 36-37

[Article by Col Ye. Besschytov: "A Single Process"]

[Text]

The drill on the tankodrome started after dark set in. The tank commanders and driver mechanics were improving their skill in operating AFVs in the dark. At the starting line Captain D. Mikhayuk, battalion commander in charge of the drill, briefed the next crew on the mission, reminded the men about the safety measures and advised them to conform to the requirements laid down in the tank operation instructions. After the briefing the crew took up their places and the AFV disappeared in the night.

The route of the tank directrix was through broken country. There were a number of artificial barriers, such as a narrow passage through a "mine field," a scarp, a cracked bridge and a deep ditch. To negotiate the route and barriers the crew had to use the night vision devices. This created additional difficulties. Finally, the tank returned to the line of departure. The crew were pleased that they had accomplished their mission. The battalion commander gave them a high mark and commanded them on their performance. This crew was followed by another, and that by still another and so on.

Later I asked the driver mechanics what they had learnt by operating the tank in darkness. They all gave similar answers. One said:

"I gained confidence in my ability." Another remarked: "After a route like that at night I am not afraid of the devil himself." Still another stated: "To be frank I felt a bit scared at first. But after finishing the route I had overcome a psychological barrier. Now I am sure I shall find my bearings in any situation."

Indeed the driver mechanics not only gained additional confidence in operating AFVs, but also developed invaluable military qualities such as self-confidence, resolve and initiative.

This is not surprising, because any drill, regardless of the degree of difficulty, besides helping to develop practical skills, contributes to moulding definite features in the men. This is because training and instruction are inseparable from education. They are two interconnected aspects of a single process. One is inconceivable without the other, each influences the other. At lessons and drills privates and sergeants master knowledge and skills that are essential for expert use of weapons and other combat equipment. This process is accompanied by education of the men, i.e. they are taught to display initiative and persistence, to act with resolve. At the same time the educational process at lessons and drills influences the quality of training and instruction, imparting ideological direction and purposefulness, developing in the men a conscientious attitude to what they are doing, a sense of personal responsibility for achievements in training and performance of duty. This enables the educators to make instruction and training more effective.

Daily duties, classes, drills and exercises on the training range, and tankodrome, in addition to deepening knowledge and extending experience, give the men an opportunity to display and strengthen their conscientiousness, truthfulness, diligence, respect for their comrades, and to develop a collective spirit and other useful qualities.

As a rule, Soviet officers are skillful in educating their subordinates in the process of instruction. By combining education with instruction they adhere to the principles elaborated by military pedagogy. The fundamental principles are Party spirit and ideological purposefulness of instruction and education. Another vital principle is to train the men in what is needed in war. This means that the officers should keep abreast of developments of weapons. In the process of instruction and education they combine individual training of the men with the training of subunits as a whole.

In modern warfare operations are exceptionally mobile and resolute. They will develop on all types of ground, round the clock in all weather conditions. To make the men efficient fighters the officers train them mentally, psychologically and physically, making full use of combat training for the purpose.

Captain D. Mikolyuk says:

"In our battalion the officers organise and conduct every drill and lesson taking into account that in modern combat every serviceman, whether tank commander, driver mechanic, gun-layer or loader, will have to summon all his moral power, and physical strength, fighting skill, experience and will power to carry out the mission assigned to him. That is why maximum use must be made of every lesson and drill to develop essential military qualities in the men."

This can be illustrated by a drill for negotiating a section of the ground mined by the "enemy." A training tank was fitted with a mine exploder. Then one crew after another negotiated the mined area. Though the explosions were simulated they produced a rather powerful psychological impact. The men got the impression that they were performing a mission in actual combat. Though they knew that they were well protected by the armour, they nevertheless had to overcome a certain psychological barrier created by the blast. However, after every successful passage of the mined area the men felt more confident.

Units and subunits are doing much to bring the training of the men closer to conditions of actual combat. In the field this is achieved largely through use of bombers and ground attack planes attacking targets in immediate proximity of the troops, launching of combat missiles, firing of live ammunition by artillery and tanks in gaps between infantry combat formations. Throwing of hand grenades, swimming across water barriers and crossing of rivers underwater are widely practised. Such drills subject the men to maximum psychological stress, extreme moral and physical

strain. They not only teach men how to act under such conditions, i.e. enable them to cope with training missions, but also help them develop necessary moral and psychological qualities, staunchness, fearlessness, contempt for danger and will for victory.

It should be borne in mind that not every combat drill will produce the necessary educational effect. Only a well thought out and purposeful drill accompanied with explanations will produce the desired educational effect. In Captain D. Mikolyuk's tank battalion practical drills in the training fields are combined with purposeful Party-political work. Under the guidance of the deputy commander for political affairs, other officers and Communists take advantage of every opportunity to talk to the privates and sergeants, to explain to them the role of political consciousness and communist convictions in mastering military equipment and weapons and improving their combat skills and to urge them to act vigorously, showing initiative and resolve.

The officers develop in the men the sense of the need for high moral and combat qualities to secure victory in war. They inspire them with greater confidence in their weapons and other combat equipment and in their own ability, encourage them to display daring and persistence in action and hold up the men who distinguish themselves as examples for others.

The development of the methods of warfare leaves its imprint on training and education and makes new and higher demands on the men. There was a time when a soldier's responsibility was practically limited to the employment of his weapon, which did not require any collective physical effort. Things are different now, when combat complexes have appeared which incorporate the latest scientific and technological achievements. Combat equipment having become more sophisticated and the conditions for its use having changed, the demands on the men behind it have been raised. Speed is important in taking in the readings of many instruments, understanding the signals being received and adopting the best decisions. This means that the men's actions should be worked up to almost automation. The men achieve high efficiency not so much through intensification of physical activity as through an increase of the element of creative thought. In training the men for work on missile, radar and other modern complexes, officers pay special attention to this aspect.

The introduction of highly advanced military equipment also alters the educational element in

the process of instruction. For instance, both the tankman and operator of a complex need will power. But in developing this quality the officers must display a different approach in each of them, for the men have to act in different conditions. The tankman has to do his job on the battlefield, the operator in the radar room. Both need will power, but each needs a will power of a different kind. To overcome the effect of negative factors influencing him during duty and to accomplish his mission the operator must acquire durable features, such as purposefulness, conscientiousness, persistence, initiative and self-reliance. In addition to these qualities, the tankman needs self-control, daring, resolve, poise, bravery and courage — features which manifest themselves mainly in face of danger. That is why the officer organising combat training must know the qualities he needs to develop in the course of instruction and the most effective way for developing them. Such a purposeful approach greatly increases the effectiveness of training and education.

Though warfare may develop to an unprecedented level, though combat equipment and weapons may acquire a tremendous potential, man will always be the main and decisive factor in war. More than that, man's role in war has considerably increased. This has raised the demands on his moral, political, combat and psychological qualities. Such moral and combat qualities as staunchness, valour, courage, bravery and ability to overcome all difficulties for the achievement of victory are especially important in modern battle. It should be borne in mind that these qualities are developed not only through the use of special educational methods and measures, but also through instruction and practical drills in combat training.

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GROUND FORCES

COMMANDER'S ROLE IN TROOP CONTROL IN COMBAT

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English, No 12, Dec 80 pp 11-13

[Article by Lt General G. Chuiko: "Initiative in Troop Control"]

[Text]

The commander plays the chief role in troop control. Success depends to a great extent on his organisational abilities and professional skill. Victory in battle attends him who better organises troop control, is more vigorous in his actions and perspicacious in his plans and decisions. Every commander should be able to orient himself in a given situation, to think clearly and logically and as clearly and precisely formulate his decisions, which are the basis of troop control. The foundation of such an ability consists of the high general military culture, varied special training, and solid practical skills of a military leader acquired in peacetime.

Practice shows that the commander's initiative is one of the most important factors of skilful control of subunits. It is manifested in the striving to find the best way of carrying out the assigned mission in any situation. Initiative based on the peculiarities of a situation always promotes success.

Thus, in July 1944, A. Fedotov, a battalion CO of the 61st Guards Infantry Regiment, noticing during an artillery barrage that the enemy was withdrawing, decided to launch an attack immediately, although it was nearly half an hour before the barrage was to end. He reported the decision to the army commander. The artillery barrage was immediately stopped and subunits passed over to the attack straight away and successfully captured the enemy positions.

Under present conditions owing to the radical changes in the character of battle, the initiative and self-dependence of the commander and others participating in control of units and sub-

units acquires incomparably greater significance. It is impossible to foresee everything in advance. Rapid and frequent changes in the situation will demand alterations to previously taken decision. If one waits for instructions from above one may lose time and this will lead to still greater complications in conditions of battle.

The commander takes full responsibility and, guided by the general purpose and intent of the superior commander's actions, reacts independently to changes in the situation. Quickly analysing the situation, he takes the necessary measures on his own initiative, chooses suitable methods of carrying out the combat mission and implements the decision taken, achieving the rout of the enemy with possibly smaller forces.

The independence allowed subordinate commanders and staffs in actions within the framework of the general mission also promotes initiative in controlling subunits.

Take, for example, an offensive battle. The possibility for displaying initiative can arise even in the advance from starting area. The commander must be ready to take resolute measures to repulse the air enemy, attacks of sabotage parties, etc. not forgetting the main objective — the annihilation of the enemy in the shortest possible time.

Many commanders cope with such missions skilfully. At a recent tactical exercise the motorised infantry battalion under Captain Bernyagin had to operate in the complicated conditions of mountain and taiga terrain. Despite this the motorised infantrymen reached in good time the line for launching an attack. Column formation ensures quick deployment of the subunit into prebattle

and battle formations. Thanks to the efficient co-operation and competent control the battalion CO managed to achieve a strict order in committing men and equipment to action and high intensity and effectiveness of fire.

During an attack of the "enemy" FEBA and while fighting in the depth the motorised infantry acted resolutely, courageously and with initiative. The commander of the military district, who was present at the exercises, gave a high appraisal of the field training of the battalion's personnel.

What was it that ensured success?

There were many factors, one of them being the ability of the battalion CO to control his subordinates' actions efficiently and to use the terrain conditions skilfully. Captain Bernyagin manoeuvred in good time with fire and subunits and assumed well considered battle formation.

The commander's ability to display initiative plays a considerable role also in a defensive battle. It is not out of place to mention here that the main mission of a subunit in defence is to hold the occupied positions, to inflict considerable losses upon the advancing enemy before he reaches the FEBA and if he penetrates the battle formations of the defenders not to allow him to advance further, to force him to abandon the offensive, creating the most favourable conditions for his subsequent rout.

In defence the commander's initiative is directed, first of all, at protecting men and equipment against enemy fire. As long as a subunit is capable of resisting, undertaking counterattacks, manoeuvring with men and equipment to frustrate an enemy attack, defence is considered active and insurmountable. This is illustrated by the following example.

At a tactical exercise the battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Kraft was assigned the mission to prevent an "enemy" sea landing. Motorised infantrymen completed organisation of the terrain with engineer works and then came the narrative: "The 'enemy' is transferring to assault landing craft. Simultaneously an 'enemy' airborne force has landed in the defenders' rear."

A critical situation arose. Quickly estimating the situation, the commander decided to send to the "enemy" landing area the company of Senior Lieutenant Alikberov and to stretch out the companies remaining on the shore along a wider frontage.

In taking such a decision, Lieutenant-Colonel Kraft proceeded from the fact that the blow at

the battalion's defences from the rear represented a serious danger, threatening to prevent fulfilment of the mission. Therefore the rout of the airborne force was the immediate task in the commander's decision. The fulfilment of this intention was made easier by the fact that near the strong point of Senior Lieutenant Alikberov was a road along which one could quickly approach the landing place of the airborne force. Owing to the lack of roads on this sector of the coast such a factor was of great importance since it made it possible to hasten the fulfilment of the mission. Consequently there were greater chances of taking the "enemy" unawares.

Making use of the rapid manoeuvre capabilities of the combat equipment the company advanced to the assigned area. Acting courageously and rapidly it attacked the "enemy" from several directions and forced him to withdraw to a depression, where it completed the rout of the landing force.

Then having carried out a march to the coast the company managed to occupy its strong point before the beginning of the "enemy" landing from the sea and took part with other subunits in repulsing the "enemy" attacks.

A meeting engagement presents great difficulty and complications from the point of view of troop control. Insufficient knowledge of the situation, its sharp changes, the tense struggle to gain time, the spreading out of actions over a wide frontage, freedom of manoeuvre and the presence of considerable gaps and exposed flanks demand of commanders the ability to estimate the situation and take a decision quickly and correctly.

Tense struggle for initiative pervades the entire meeting engagement and defines its outcome. As soon as one of the sides having exhausted its capabilities in the struggle to seize and hold the initiative abandons its intention of achieving the assigned mission of the offensive, the meeting engagement loses its specific character and assumes that of other kinds of combat actions.

The struggle to gain time plays a most important role in the control of subunits in a meeting engagement. The outstanding Russian military leader A. V. Suvorov's saying that a minute decides success in battle, an hour the success of a campaign and a day a success of a whole war, does not lose its importance today considering the fluid character of modern warfare. Therefore the

commander's initiative directed at quick fulfilment of the decisions taken is of paramount importance for victory.

The initiative in control has a particular role in carrying out combat actions in special conditions and also in encirclement. In particular, fighting in encirclement demands of the commander a creative approach to organising a perimeter defence, resolute measures for destroying the penetrated enemy, organisation of cooperation and re-establishment of communication with neighbours and superior command, organisation of logistical support and escape from encirclement.

In this case it is important not to allow a concentration of subunits in a small area so as to preclude the possibility of their destruction by powerful fire.

In controlling subunits during combat actions in the depth of the enemy defences when the flanks are exposed and the situation is complicated and insufficiently clear, the commander must display resourcefulness, imagination and initiative. In such a case it is necessary to combine creative activity with flexibility and firmness of control. The actions of the mobile groups used in a number of offensive operations during the Great Patriotic War were notable for these qualities. Thus, during the Voronezh-Kastornoye operation carried out by the Voronezh Front, the Tank Corps, pursuing the enemy, approached the rear of his grouping. The corps was redirected from the western direction to the northern, went through the Nazi rear, destroying important installations, and rushed into Kastornoye. As a result, the enemy withdrawal routes were cut and this considerably promoted the successful completion of the front's operation.

For achieving success in actions in which the situation can change sharply at any moment, the commander's initiative is directed at securing precise cooperation of all elements of the battle formation, at manoeuvring quickly with men and equipment.

What are the major factors influencing the seizure and holding of the initiative?

First of all there is the surprise factor. Surprise makes it possible to stun the enemy, to take him unawares, to paralyse his will to resist and deprive him of the possibility to take the necessary countermeasures. However, surprise alone does not always secure the seizure and holding of the initiative. It only creates an initial advantageous situation which one must know how to exploit.

A reliable way of seizing and holding the initiative consists in actions to mislead the enemy and also to use new methods of fighting which he does not expect.

Well organised and constantly maintained co-operation and reliable troop control are indispensable conditions for holding the initiative.

Other conditions are continuous and active reconnaissance, which makes it possible to reveal the enemy's intentions and concepts and thus to preclude any element of surprise.

The rout of the enemy in a short time and with minimum losses depends to a great extent on the quality of troop control which is based on centralisation and a wide display of initiative and self-dependence by every commander.

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GROUND FORCES

ANTITANK TRAINING METHODS DESCRIBED

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English, No 12, Dec 80 pp 18-19

[Article by Major A. Mineyev: "Fighting Tanks"]

[Text]

Modern armies are so abundantly supplied with various armoured equipment that, according to foreign specialists, not only on the main lines of advance, but practically on every kilometre of the frontage up to 15-20 tanks will be operating. Fighting them is a most important mission, an important component part of a combined arms battle. And this explains the attention paid to the training of personnel to fight tanks with close combat weapons: small arms, antitank grenades and antitank grenade launchers. Despite the existence of ATGMs, antitank artillery and combat helicopters, the role of these weapons, particularly in close combat, must not be neglected.

LESSONS OF THE WAR

This battle took place on November 16, 1941, near Moscow. Twenty-eight men of the Panfilov Division had taken up defensive positions here. Against them came tanks. Many tanks. Several dozens of them. The armoured monsters moved forward firing their guns and machine guns. But suddenly as if it had come up against some unseen obstacle one tank stopped. A few seconds passed and a flame appeared on the rear of its hull and soon enveloped the whole vehicle. The second tank began to spin round with a broken track. The third one was emitting smoke which blackened the snow all around.

Leaving blazing tanks before the Soviet positions, the Hitlerites retreated. But after reforming they again resumed the attack. And again, on the same line after bunches of grenades and incendiary bottles had been accurately aimed by the defenders, the enemy tanks caught fire one after the other. Their armour, guns and submachine guns were powerless before a small handful of Soviet men.

The unequal battle lasted four hours. Many times the Nazis launched their attacks but were unable to break through the defence. The Soviet fighting men did not flinch. They destroyed 18 tanks and did not let the enemy through their positions.

The experience of war teaches that only psychologically steeled men, skilfully handling their weapons can stand up an armoured vehicle. Therefore, during training, a situation closely resembling real combat is created. In this way stable moral-combat qualities, helping to overcome the

fear of tanks are developed. Tactical and drill exercises devoted to training the men in the methods of tank fighting with close combat weapons are carried out on a specially equipped ground. Here the fighting men get to know what a company strong point is and how it is defended by antitank fire and mines.

PREPARATION FOR A TRAINING PERIOD

The study of a theme usually begins with demonstration lessons in method for instructors. Their purpose is to give the officers and section leaders starting directions, to show an advanced method of training and educating the men and in particular of working up training questions. Account is taken of the exceptional importance of giving the men psychological steeling, the purpose of which is to develop stable emotional and will qualities.

This process is carried out in a strict order and is complex in character. For example, at exercises on reconnaissance the servicemen study the characteristics of the armoured equipment of foreign armies. When studying topics of engineer training the servicemen acquire the skills in digging entrenchments, slit and fire trenches, camouflaging them and making use of a variety of natural covers from which one can fight advancing enemy tanks. Physical training also favours to acquire the qualities necessary for tank fighters. Party-political work also helps to develop these qualities in the personnel.

During individual and collective talks, for example, the commanders explain the significance of skillful actions when repulsing mass attacks by the enemy tanks and cite examples of heroism shown by Soviet soldiers during the Great Patriotic War. In general use is made of tested methods which show that negative emotions such as fear of tanks can be remedied.

On the appointed day the subunit arrives at the training field with weapons. Having formed up the company, the company commander explains the topic, the purpose of the exercise, the training questions and draws attention to safety measures. Then the platoon commanders take their subordinates to their training grounds. As a rule, there are three grounds. We shall deal at length with the organisation of exercises at each of them.

TANKS' STRONG AND WEAK POINTS

At training ground No. 1 the 1st platoon studies under the leadership of the platoon leader the characteristics of tanks and APCs of foreign armies, their strong and weak points.

During the exercise dummies, placards, stands with sketches and drawings are shown. Skill in fighting tanks consists in neutralising their strong points, and knowing their weak points, competently using the available weapons of destruction. The strong points of tanks include their high cross-country ability on the battlefield, their various types of armament with all-round fire, independence in operations and reliable protection against fire weapons.

At the same time tanks have weak points. In fire duels with infantry located in trenches, fire trenches and other covers and armed with antitank grenade launchers and antitank grenades, the crews of advancing tanks experience great difficulties. The point is that usually only machine-gun fire is used against such small targets as tank fighters. And even this fire is not effective within a radius of 8-10 metres from the tank because this zone is a dead area.

When there are several targets the tank crew can fight each of them separately. Here it is necessary to take into consideration that the gun layer will open aimed fire at the enemy only when he detects him. The tank itself is a rather big target. A well trained soldier will always be able to destroy it at a short distance with fire from a grenade launcher or with an antitank grenade.

From the commander's explanation the men will know that the thickness of tanks' armour is not the same everywhere. The strongest is the frontal armour of the hull and turret. Taking this into consideration and also the angle of inclination of the front armour sheets it is more advisable to fire at the sides of the tank's hull.

But the most vulnerable spot of a tank is its running gear: driving and idler wheels, road wheels and tracks. It is true that on some tanks the upper parts of the tracks, and parts of the support rollers and suspension are covered with an armoured sheet — the hull skirting. Despite this the running gear remains the tank's most vulnerable spot.

The commander goes on to explain the other vulnerable spots of armoured equipment. This helps the trainees to appreciate better the efficiency of all close combat weapons. For example, safety glass and optical instruments can be put out of action by concentrated small arms fire, while the tank's stern, radiator, ventilation slits for feeding air to and cooling the engine are the most vulnerable spots for incendiaries.

MINES AND GRENADES AGAINST TANKS

At training ground No. 2 the second platoon studies mine obstacles for holding up tanks and the rules for throwing antitank hand grenades. Here, as a rule, three training points are organised.

At the first training point one section under the supervision of its commander studies antitank mines. On specially organised sectors there are shell-holes, pits, blocks and other antitank obstacles. Here the men train to lay mines.

At a second training point the second section studies the structure and the rules of throwing antitank grenades. Installed here are working models of tanks and APCs. There are trenches and foxholes along the path of their move-

ment. During the lesson, the places for throwing grenades are changed so as to teach the men to destroy the tanks by throwing grenades at frontal armour, the sides of the hull, and the stern.

Great attention is paid to peculiarities of throwing antitank grenades. They weigh more than fragmentation grenades. Therefore the exercise director recommends throwing along a flat trajectory.

At this training point motorized infantrymen realise that efficiency in fighting tanks depends to a considerable extent on the skilful choice and organisation of fire positions with engineer works. They train in flank and cross fire.

The motorised infantrymen of the 3rd section study explosives and means of setting off an explosion: trinitrotoluene blocks, detonating caps and various charges. When studying this training question particular attention is paid to strict observance of safety measures.

ROLLING OVER BY TANKS

At training point No. 3 the 3rd platoon under the leadership of the company commander learns rolling over by tanks and the methods of fighting tanks and other armoured equipment. Various means of close fighting are used: hand antitank grenade launchers, antitank grenades and incendiary bottles, mines and small arms.

At the point is a tank with its crew and a radio set for communication with it. Pillboxes, communication trenches and a dummy building are organised along the tank's path.

To begin with the company commander shows the way to use natural cover for protection against tank fire, and the dead zone when guns and machine guns are fired. Then he goes on to explain the sequence of actions in fighting armoured targets.

Taking his place in a trench the instructing officer prepares to fire and as soon as the tank begins to move he opens fire with a submachine gun (with blank cartridges) at optical instruments and safety glasses. When the tank approaches within 10-15 m a trainee throws a practice grenade and drops to the bottom of a trench. The company commander draws the attention of the trainees to the fact that after throwing the grenade one must move to the right or to the left. In actual fighting if the tank survives its crew will certainly try to drive over the trench.

Having let the tank pass, the instructing officer throws an incendiary bottle (dummy) at the stern of the disappearing vehicle.

In other cases in order to remain undetected and put a tank out of action by unexpectedly throwing a grenade one can use a cuvette by the road, shell-hole or any building. So, using a dummy building the trainees work up the methods of destroying armoured targets during fighting in an inhabited locality, from windows of upper storeys of buildings and from basements.

The trainees taking up positions along the path of a tank perform one after the other the actions shown by the instructor, learn to throw a grenade at the most vulnerable spots of a tank: the hull, the engine section and the running gear. The company commander controls the crew by radio and jointly with the platoon leader observes the actions of motorised infantrymen and corrects their mistakes. During the exercises battle noises: shots, shell bursts, roar of engines are broadcast by loudspeakers. This brings the training still closer to reality, favours the development in the servicemen of such qualities as courage, resolve and confidence that they can successfully fight enemy tanks with close combat weapons.

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GROUND FORCES

AIR DEFENCE TRAINING IN A MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 80 pp 20-21

[Article by Colonel V. Subbotin: "AA Gunners in a Defensive Battle"]

[Text]

Fire from the opposite bank was so heavy that Captain Ovchinnikov, the motorized infantry battalion commander, realised that an assault crossing on the move would not be possible. It meant that pursuit came to an end and they had to assume the defensive. Such a turn had been envisaged, the battalion commander had precise instructions on that score and knew on what line he should consolidate to repulse possible "enemy" attacks.

When organising the defence he laid particular emphasis upon defence of the battalion against air raids, as counter-attacks are usually supported by aviation. Captain Ovchinnikov summoned Senior Lieutenant A. Zatayev, commander of the AA battery, to his CP-OP, and ordered him to organise defence of the battalion against "enemy" air attacks. It was assumed that "enemy" planes and helicopters would attack at low altitudes.

The assistant exercise director asked: "From which direction do you expect helicopter attacks?" Though neither the battalion commander nor the battery commander possessed relevant information from the senior commander they assessed the situation correctly and concluded that helicopter attacks were most likely from the Krugly Wood and Snegiri Grove directions. The assistant exercise director agreed with their conclusion. Indeed, under these conditions it would be very advantageous for the "enemy" to use combat helicopters. Using protective features of the terrain, especially the wood south-west of the battalion defence area, they could deliver a surprise attack on the defender's main force and considerably weaken him.

Proceeding from these considerations the battalion commander consulted the battery commander and decided to lay an anti-aircraft ambush of several AA riflemen in the threatened direction. A platoon of ZSU-23-4 AA SP guns was also sent there as a roving subunit with the mission of protecting the 2nd and 3rd motorised infantry companies and other units operating under the immediate command of the battalion commander.

An antiaircraft ambush is normally put out when there is a shortage of AA weapons, and in all cases when enemy aircraft are flying beyond the range of these weapons, in order to inflict losses on him and deny him freedom of movement in the given direction.

This method of fighting an air enemy has proved its worth. AA ambushes were extensively used during the Great Patriotic War and also in the struggle of Vietnamese patriots against the American aggressors.

For instance, a battery of an antiaircraft artillery regiment taking part in blocking an encircled Nazi force in the Bobruisk area was advanced in the direction of likely flights of enemy supply planes. Having secretly occupied and camouflaged their positions the AA gunners prepared to deliver fire. The Hitlerites expected no AA weapons in this area. Soon several groups of aircraft appeared. The gunners' accurate fire took them by surprise and 8 planes were shot down.

Roving subunits, the ZSU-23-4 platoon in our case, supplement effectively the AA fire system organised in defence. They fire from temporary positions thus limiting the freedom of enemy planes to manoeuvre in the area and misleading them as to the layout and dispositions of AA weapons.

But let us return to the exercise. Upon arrival at the battalion CP, the battery commander performed timing, and then specified the mission, estimated the situation and prepared a verbal order. This procedure is the most advisable way of doing. During exercises it sometimes happens that after accepting a mission commanders do not have enough time to organise the battle. This is because they fail to foresee in time what measures must be taken beforehand to prepare the battery for accomplishing its mission. Yet this work, though not requiring a long time, introduces the proper order into a commander's operation and ensures timely preparation of all subunits for action.

The success of defensive operations depends largely on on-the-spot reconnaissance. The fact that the battery of Senior Lieutenant Zatayev could redeploy at night and get

ready for firing and that during the battle it fulfilled exactly the assigned mission was the result of thorough on-the-spot reconnaissance. While it was still light they reconnoitred the routes of advance to alternate and temporary (for the roving platoon) positions and also positions to be occupied during manoeuvres in the course of battle. These positions had been foreseen when coordinating combat actions with the commander of the battalion they were to cover. It was also decided how the AA gunners were to act when attacking the "enemy" on the approaches to the defences, repelling his attacks in front of the forward edge, opposing his attempt to penetrate the defences, etc.

The battery commander assigned combat missions to his subordinates after he had completed on-the-spot reconnaissance, determined the actions of his gunners and coordinated them with the commanders of the units to be protected.

In the operation order he pointed out in particular:

"The 'enemy' has managed to stop our advance on the line: Antipovo-Snegiri Grove (see the Sketch) and when reserves are brought up can launch a counterattack. The activity of his air force has increased. His planes and helicopters are attacking our positions and logistical installations. The subunits have assumed the defensive on the line: Antipovo-Snegiri Grove.


"The battery's mission is to cover the 1st Mts Inf Bn against attacks of 'enemy' planes and helicopters during defensive battle, to prevent his aerial reconnaissance and flights in the direction: Zimino-Semyonovo.

"Firing positions: primary — 500 m north of Hill 115.0, alternate — 600 m north-west of Hill 130.7. The 1st platoon will act as a roving subunit from temporary firing positions.

"By 2345 hrs the platoon commanders will prepare their subunits for advancing to new firing positions. During march and on firing positions observe blackout, maintain a 50-m distance between vehicles, and be ready to repulse 'enemy' air raids and to engage ground targets.

"Control and warning signals: 'Air alarm' — white smoke flare in the direction of the target, by radio — signal 'Air alarm'; 'Enemy tanks' — red smoke flare in the direction of the 'enemy' tanks, by radio — 'Enemy tanks'; 'Enemy Infantry' — green smoke flare in the direction of the 'enemy', by radio — 'Enemy Infantry'."

Till dawn the AA gunners were engaged in strenuous work. Some of the men were on the alert, ready to open fire on the air "enemy." Others were completing organisation of positions with engineer works. As soon as the "enemy" started an artillery barrage the crews of AA SP



guns took up their places in the vehicles, and AA gunners in the trenches. Soon "enemy" planes were reported.

On the order of Senior Lieutenant Zaleev the gunners effected a search in the indicated direction and before long detected the targets. Due to strong jamming their blips on the radar indicators were scarcely visible. The operators executed the "cut out jamming" command and as soon as low-flying aircraft entered the battery's fire zone they opened fire.

Timely target detection, correct selection of shooting methods and type of fire helped the AA gunners to repulse the air raid.

The second "enemy" air attack came from a south-westerly direction. The first to engage them were the roving SP guns which had changed their positions after the first attack. Their fire was accurate. The umpires assessed the firing results and informed the pilots of their "losses."

The "enemy" artillery then pounded the ZSU-23-4 positions. But there were no guns there at the time — after a brief fire duel they had changed their positions.

In this defensive battle the motorised infantry battalion fulfilled the assigned mission and the AA battery, reliably covering the subunits against air attacks contributed in no small measure to this.

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GROUND FORCES

MAINTENANCE OF INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 80 pp 22-23

[Article: "IFV Maintenance"]

[Text]

Our correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel I. Barchukov visited a unit in the Order of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District. He asked Captain V. Nikitin, deputy battalion commander for technical service, and Lieutenant O. Antonov, a platoon commander, about the operation, repair and maintenance of infantry fighting vehicles.

During firing practice you always get excellent and good marks. What are the factors of your success? Has your subunit any special method for servicing the IFV armament?

Dep. Bn CO. Lieutenant Antonov's men are thoroughly familiar with the interaction of cannon and machine-gun parts and also with the design and functioning of fire control instruments. They keep the accessories and instruments for cleaning the IFV armament in good working order. After each firing the crews clean and lubricate machine gun and cannon bores.

Pl Com. Of course, skillful maintenance and timely cleaning of armament largely predetermines success during firing practice. Before firing, we remove lubricant thoroughly, see that there are no faults in the systems and check the reliability of interaction of machine-gun and cannon parts and mechanisms.

After firing, the IFV armament is subjected to routine maintenance. To this end, we perform partial dismantling. Particularly dirty spots are wiped clean with waste moistened in kerosene or white spirit. For cleaning the bore, we use hot water or diesel fuel.

Normally, the armament is checked every two weeks. In our conditions this has to be done more frequently, with IFV crews taking a most active part. Special attention is paid to the bores. When servicing the cannon, we never fail to check functioning of the breech mechanism, power supply to the electric unit, condition of the obturator

spring and operation of the elevating and traversing gears.

You handle the equipment in rather unusual conditions. In particular, operation of the engine and other units and assemblies in mountainous and desert terrain entails increased mechanical and temperature loads, which sharply impairs lubrication and cooling. What preventive measures are taken in this respect?

Dep. Bn CO. You are quite right. At altitudes exceeding 1,000 m the rarefied air overenriches the gas mixture, thereby markedly impairing engine operation; fuel combustion is incomplete, power drops and, sometimes, the engine overheats. Continuous engine operation on overrich mixture results in numerous troubles.

Pl Com. In these conditions IFV drivers keep a constant watch on the oil pressure in the lubrication system, oil level in the engine and other units, and on the condition of oil seals. At each halt we remove dust from the external surfaces of crankcases.

Dep. Bn CO. Moreover, at high altitudes fans are less effective, air flow through radiators is weaker and cooling less intense. On sandy soils a layer of dust settles on the radiator, engine and other units. Heat irradiation is impaired, coolant gets overheated and more is lost through evaporation. The servicemen remedy the adverse effects of these factors by thorough preparation of IFVs for a march, good maintenance and constant control of their functioning on the move.

Pl Com. Prior to leaving the park, on a march or during exercises the crews constantly keep an eye on the condition of the engine fuel, air and oil supply systems. There have been cases of faulty engine operation on some vehicles, mainly due to untimely or insufficient care of the fuel supply system and young drivers' violation of the rules for assembling the coarse fuel filter.

This is partially the result of omissions at technical training lessons, isn't it?

Dep. Bn CO. Unfortunately, that is sometimes the case. So, to make up for the omissions, we organise additional practice lessons for young drivers to show them the proper way of servicing the fuel supply system and refilling the fuel system. We also put them on guard against drawing fuel from the bottom of a container, where sediments accumulate, and pouring it into the system otherwise than through a silk strainer.

It is noteworthy that on mountainous and desert terrain the work of storage batteries also considerably deteriorates: water evaporates from the electrolyte, dust clogs the vent plug openings and settles on the plugs, thereby increasing self-discharge of the batteries. That is why the crews constantly check the level of electrolyte and wipe dust from batteries.

Pl Com. At technical training lessons, during maintenance and before a march we see to it that the drivers listen attentively to the operation of the engine and check its systems for proper sealing. They are well aware that in hot weather several minutes will suffice for oil, fuel and coolant to leak out of the system completely through any loose joint or crack. This can be avoided if the oil seals are tightened and lubricant topped up in strict compliance with the standards, for heated superfluous oil will somehow or other leak out through the oil seals. An oily hull will be covered with a thick layer of dust, thus overheating still worse.

Driving IFVs on cross-country, mountainous and desert terrain, salt marshes and sands is considerably complicated. How do you attain high speeds in such conditions?

Pl. Com. Experienced drivers make skillful use of acceleration and braking with the engine. In approaching a crest, they slow down and shift to a lower gear. Then, braking a little, they go down smoothly. They negotiate pits and ravines in low gear, keeping engine revs constant. Before climbing another crest they increase the revs smoothly and, letting the vehicle gain speed, change into a higher gear.

Dep. Bn CO. A serviceable vehicle is easy to control and manoeuvre, and possesses good cross-country capacity. However, young drivers sometimes fail to estimate the terrain properly and choose a wrong mode of movement, which results in engine overheating, or stalling, or track chain slipping off. This, in turn, leads to loss of time to remedy the trouble and to excessive fuel consumption.

Pl Com. That is why, on loose soils and on up- and down-grades drivers use the speed which is best for non-stop and safe movement. Sharp turns are negotiated in first, second or reverse gear in several steps, driving the vehicle 3-5 m forward after each turn.

A moving column raises dust, makes deep ruts and bears stones and hollows often exceeding the vehicle ground clearance. On rough roads care should be taken to keep the IFV from swaying from side to side and the road wheel arms from striking the stops. Failure to do this may lead to denting of the vehicle bottom, disturbed centring of assemblies and poor sealing of the hull.

When negotiating sandy sectors, we try to avoid moving all along the same trail, especially on saline soils, where vehicles may get stuck. Such sectors are reconnoitred in advance, lanes are made if necessary and movement is then continued.

Dep. Bn CO. At driving lessons the men study the rules and peculiarities of IFV maintenance on mountainous and desert terrain and typical faults and steps to be taken to prevent them. We also work up methods of negotiating drift sands, salt marshes, steep up- and down-grades, and of driving IFV in a dust-laden atmosphere and with limited visibility.

Do repair subunits help you to service the IFVs?

Dep. Bn CO. Some platoon commanders believe that IFV maintenance is only repair and maintenance subunits' responsibility. In reality, crews do a great deal of work inspecting mechanisms and adjusting units and assemblies. Drivers improve their knowledge of the IFV structure and acquire the necessary practical skills in servicing the equipment.

Complicated operations, e.g. adjustment of the engine clutch and fuel pump control linkage, are performed by the crews under direct supervision of the deputy commander for technical service. Checking the radio for proper functioning, adjustment of the cannon loading mechanism and other complicated work is done by communication and ammunition repair subunits and by repair specialists.

Pl Com. Maintenance of the running gear, lubrication of the road wheel arms tubes, checking tensioning of track and hydraulic shock absorbers upper eye rings, tightening track wedges and certain other operations are generally performed by IFV crews independently.

Servicing subunits' help is always of great use to us. We have close friendly contacts with them. Servicemen in these subunits are not only good at their job, they are also good instructors. While servicing IFVs, they help the crews to do the necessary practical work and to understand the physical essence of the processes taking place in units and mechanisms, and explain the peculiarities of IFV operation on mountainous and desert terrain.

GROUND FORCES

COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE DURING WARTIME DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 80 pp 26-27

[Article by Colonel A. Galitsan, cand. sc. (History): "Combat Reconnaissance"]

[Text]

The article deals with the main methods used in carrying out combat reconnaissance in preparation for an offensive during the Great Patriotic War.

Combat reconnaissance is a type of tactical reconnaissance. It is carried out by reconnaissance, motorised infantry, tank and paratroop subunits to ensure success of the troops' combat actions. The main methods of combat reconnaissance are observation, search, raid, ambush and reconnaissance in force.

Rich experience in organising and carrying out combat reconnaissance was accumulated by the Soviet forces during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). It was considered as one of the most important types of combat activity.

Infantry divisions had reconnaissance companies and infantry regiments had platoons of infantry and cavalry reconnaissance. They were composed of physically strong, courageous men skilled in the combat technique of fighting at close quarters and marksmen.

When preparing an offensive battle great attention was paid to observation of the enemy — one of the main methods of reconnaissance. It was organised in all situations and was continuous. Observation was carried out by commanders, staff officers and observers detailed for the purpose in subunits from observation posts and command and observation posts and also by observation posts provided with observation devices and communication means. By night and in conditions of poor visibility observation was supplemented by listening.

The number of observers and observation posts depended on the mission carried out, the width of the zone of combat actions, the character of terrain, the time of the day and the situation. During preparation for an offensive observers were usually detailed as follows: in a section one observer; in a platoon and company one or two ob-

servers; in a battalion two or three observers; at the command and observation post one-two observation posts. Besides, engineer and chemical observation posts were organised. As a result, units and formations had a rather dense network of observation posts. Thus, in the Vitabsk-Orsha operation in June 1944, the forces of the 1st Baltic Front organised 2,340 various observation posts, i.e. 30 observation posts per kilometre of frontage.

Men possessing a keen hearing and knowing German were selected for carrying out reconnaissance by listening. Posts comprising 2-3 men were organised out of them.

The reconnaissance men listened to any kinds of sounds, engine noises, talks in the enemy lines. Groups provided with special apparatus for listening-in to enemy telephone conversations were also detailed.

By observation and listening the men established areas of concentration of the main enemy forces, time of regrouping or replacing of his forces, artillery and mortar emplacement areas, places of command and observation posts, communication centres and obtained other information.

Here is how reconnaissance by observation was carried out in the 771st Inf Reg when preparing for the offensive in the summer of 1944. According to the results of observation and the information given by an enemy soldier who deserted to our side on the regiment's sector, the regimental commander came to the preliminary conclusion that the enemy was preparing for a counterattack which could be expected at night or at dawn the following day. However, some facts in the enemy behaviour were at variance with this conclusion. The regimental commander therefore ordered increased observation.

A few hours later battalion and regimental posts detected movement of enemy motor transport and manpower in the rear and withdrawal of an artillery battery. This data showed that enemy forces were withdrawing from the line

they occupied. The regiment immediately passed over to the offensive and routed the enemy.

During the war wide use was made of a search to take prisoners. It was carried out by reconnaissance and motorised infantry subunits from a section to a reinforced platoon, or by groups of 6-16 specially selected men.

During the first years of the war a search, as a rule, was carried out at night-time. However, when the enemy began to assume deep defensive, a search was most frequently carried out one or two hours after dawn or in bad weather.

The ways and methods of carrying out a search varied greatly. Take a daylight search carried out by Soviet recce men in March 1943, in the Ruzaikas area. The regiment's reconnaissance group consisting of nine men under Starshina Trukhin was detailed to take a prisoner. The recce men were covered by eight 82- and 120-mm mortars.

When preparing for the search the recce men thoroughly studied the terrain, the enemy fire and defence systems and the objective — a machine-gun emplacement on the south-eastern slopes of a nameless hill had been chosen. It was decided to launch the attack at 0900 hrs in the morning after relief of sentries when enemy vigilance was considerably weaker: only men on duty remained in the trenches while the others had a rest in dugouts.

On the night of March 5, combat engineers made passages through the mine fields, strictly observing camouflage measures. Before dawn, the recce men crawled noiselessly in groups of two or three to shell-holes and craters and lay flat in them continuing to observe the enemy. At 0900 hrs when the sentries had been relieved they rushed into the enemy trench and captured two Hitlerites. But the enemy spotted the recce men. Running out of their dugouts, the Nazis opened fire. At that time on a signal of the regimental reconnaissance officer mortars fired at the hill and the enemy soldiers withdrew to their dugouts. Later they resumed the attack. Given the situation, three recce men were ordered to take the prisoners to the Soviet lines while the rest continued battle. Starshina Trukhin called artillery fire on this area and under its cover the recce men withdrew. The mission was successfully fulfilled without any losses.

Ambush is one of the methods of carrying out combat reconnaissance. It consists in a secret positioning of a sub-unit (group) in good time on probable routes of movement of separate enemy soldiers or small groups, for capturing prisoners of war, documents, specimens of weapons and equipment.

Ambushes were used both when preparing for and during an offensive. The places for them were chosen near paths, roads, deliberately damaged wire communication lines, at water sources, crossings, bridges and lanes through obstacles.

Depending on the situation ambushes were laid on the enemy forward line, before the forward line of our advanced (protecting) subunits, in the areas of both friendly and enemy forces.

In December 1943, a reconnaissance group of the 173rd Infantry Division acted skillfully in ambush in the Orsha area.

Observation had established that enemy soldiers often went for water to a pond located in no man's land. As a rule, they appeared on the forward line in groups of 5-10 men. It was decided to organise an ambush at the pond to capture an "identification prisoner." A reconnaissance group consisting of eight men under Guards Sergeant Koltov crawled across no man's land at nightfall and approached the enemy wire entanglement. The Soviet recce men secretly took up positions near a path leading to the pond.

Soon a group of enemy soldiers appeared. Three of them went to the pond while the rest lay flat at the wire. In the clash that followed seven Nazi soldiers were killed and one taken prisoner.

In order to obtain full and trustworthy information on the enemy wide use was made of reconnaissance in force during the Great Patriotic War. While preparing an offensive it was carried out with the purpose of determining the positions of the opposing enemy grouping, specifying the layout of the FEBA and fire system and also of preventing fire on abandoned or weakly defended positions.

To mislead the enemy a reconnaissance in force was regularly carried out in different directions and at different times of the day. It was carried out with preliminary fire barrage or without it. In case the enemy undertook a counterattack all subunits were in a state of readiness for action. During a reconnaissance in force subunit commanders carried out continuous observation of the sectors where the reconnaissance was being made.

If the enemy front was not continuous, formations and units in the offensive carried out reconnaissance in the enemy rear with their reconnaissance groups. They revealed the enemy concentration areas, carried out secret observation, captured documents and messengers. The reconnaissance men endeavoured to fulfil their missions without getting involved in fighting. As a rule, they moved by night strictly observing camouflage measures, bypassing inhabited localities and big roads. Secrecy and surprise were the most important principles of the reconnaissance groups' actions.

The experience of the war shows that while preparing for an offensive it is necessary to make combat reconnaissance both before the enemy FEBA and through its entire depth. Skilful and uninterrupted reconnaissance during an offensive through the entire depth of a combat mission ensured a thorough study of the enemy and made it possible to strike surprise blows at him.

The experience of reconnaissance during the war retains its significance today. Reconnaissance still remains one of the most important types of combat security and support and determines to a great extent the course and outcome of combat actions. The development of new weapons of war which has resulted in changes in forms and methods of warfare has considerably broadened the reconnaissance missions and complicated the conditions of their organization.

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NAVAL FORCES

NAVIGATION IN CONFINED WATERS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Baranov: "Navigation in Narrows"]

[Text]

NARROWS are confined waters where manoeuvring of ships is restricted by the close proximity of the shores, reefs, shallows and, in war, of mine fields. Navigation in narrows, such as canals, straits, ports, channels, skerries and estuaries of navigable rivers, is difficult and involves stress. Such features as rapidly changing situation, limited choice and frequent change of course, and sometimes complete lack of room to manoeuvre give rise to a number of specific requirements for navigation in narrows. In such conditions navigation follows a previously plotted course only along channels, canals and on recommended courses, following exactly the leading line or keeping the starboard side of the prescribed channel.

Dead reckoning is carried out with particular thoroughness only on corrected charts to a scale of 1:50,000 or larger. The calculation and plotting of course and distances, assessment of actual drift, determination of the actual width of the channel occupied by the ship during a turn should be especially accurate. Sailors know that carelessness in calculations may cause the ship to run aground.

In narrows the ship is piloted by the commander, navigating officer (personally) and more competent watch officer (executive officer).

At sharp turns on entering a narrow and during the entire passage through it, the safety of the ship will depend on the commander's, navigating officer's and watch officer's knowledge of the navigation of the ship, the peculiarities of the port, roadstead, channels, buoyage, leading lines and other signs. Naturally, besides this there must be a combination of estimation by sight with instrument control of safety of navigation and thorough observation of the situation by signalmen, radarmen and other observers.

The entire crew prepares in advance for navigation in narrows. For instance, the watch officer writes out and studies the axis of every turn in the channel, their compass

courses, distances and time from one turn to another and from one buoy (stake) to another, the magnitudes of turn and clearing bearings, distances, angles, rudder angles and engine speeds for every turn. When studying the chart the officers should pay attention to the appearance of lighthouses, buoyage, light characteristics, landmarks and natural ranges. They should try to remember the sections of the channel in which the ship's speed should be reduced, in which passage at night is forbidden, confined sections in which passing of ships is difficult, permitted anchorages, corrections of the master and reserve course indicators, correction and factor of log, data on currents and expected weather.

It is obvious from the above that the watch officer should be extremely attentive. He should see to it that the course and speed are maintained, he should watch the motion of the stern, changes of bearings when passing ships, he should check the accuracy of the ship's movement to see that it coincides with preliminary plotting, the timeliness and accuracy of turns. With the commander's permission the watch officer may execute the pass manoeuvre.

To ensure a higher degree of safety and to maintain the degree of readiness already acquired, relief of the watch during passage through narrows, while passing oncoming ships and during execution of turns is strictly forbidden.

The navigating officer plays a big role in ensuring safety of passage through narrows. The effective execution of a manoeuvre depends on his efficiency, on his timely notification of turns, the quickness and accuracy with which the ship's position is determined.

The preparations of the ship include the following measures: higher degree of readiness of the combat information centre, emergency steering stations and forecastle team, engines to be kept in a state of readiness for reversing and the anchor for lowering, the ship's water tight-

ness is checked, and all outboard devices that are lowered are raised.

Visual observation and observation with the help of technical means are intensified. To this end the radar is switched over to indication of true movement (or stabilisation on course) with periodic return to indication of relative movement. To detect small targets, such as buoys, stakes, launches or rowing boats the plan-position indicator is switched to a larger scale — i.e. up to 3-6 miles.

In narrows all oncoming and overtaking targets are dangerous. Therefore, it is the special concern of the commander to be able to go over to emergency steering or engine control devices in the shortest possible time. As a rule, he himself will observe the situation and check the navigator's calculations. Passing and overtaking of ships should be executed in broad straight sections of the channel. The shortest distance between ships in overtaking should be at least half the length of the bigger ship.

In narrows the ships should maintain safe speeds calculated in advance for every section of the channel. Such speeds help prevent collisions for example by bringing the ship to a standstill within the required distance. Safe speed is variable and depends on the visual range and radar visibility, traffic in a channel and the ship's manoeuvrability. In addition, in calculating the safe speed, weather conditions, currents, proximity of navigational hazards, relation of the ship's draught to depth, observation possibilities, clarity and timeliness of reports to the command station are taken into account. The distance at which a ship should be stopped to avoid hitting an obstacle, such as an oncoming ship, a ship at anchor, a buoy, and which forms an element of a safe speed, is determined by the commander.

The accuracy of the ship's movement in keeping with preliminary plotting is checked in confined sections by observing the safety lines of position (isolines) and reaches by periodic observations.

When the ship passes close to navigational hazards use is made of navigational safety parameters, such as bearings, distances and angles, the zones ahead are explored by means of sonar equipment and checked by echo sounding. Both the navigation room and the bridge should have diagrams of narrows with the courses plotted on them together with the buoyage and shore signs.

The clearance isoline is the limit of the safe zone. It corresponds to the permissible limit value of the navigational parameter being measured and is plotted on the map in the form of a bearing, circle or isobath curve.

Owing to simplicity of plotting and convenience of measurement the clearing bearing is most frequently used. Pre-

ference is given to landmarks located either ahead or astern of the ship.

If there is a pin-point radar marker such as a sheer cape, cliff, isolated island or a corner reflector near a navigational hazard, a safe distance is used. In this case the radar marker is accepted as the centre of a safe circle. Checking the safety of passage with the help of safe distances is performed on the basis of reference points located abeam of the ship.

A horizontal angle of safety is used when there are two reference points in a zone of navigational hazard. The safety line is an arc of a circle passing through both reference points and containing the horizontal angle of safety.

When there is a high reference point in proximity of a navigational hazard and its height may be measured with a sextant, it is possible to apply what is known as a vertical angle of safety.

A clearance isobath is a line that safeguards the ship against hazardous depths. In shallow zones the clearance isobath is one with a depth corresponding to the ship's draught with outboard devices in the lowered position plus 2-4 metres. In deep waters the clearance isobath is a 10 metre one for ships with a draught of less than five metres and a 20 metre one for ships with a draught of more than five metres.

When a ship passes through narrows her position is determined with the help of leading lines and intersecting safety lines of position, with a chart reckoning adapter to the radar station and also with highly accurate radiionavigational devices.

If the ship is in range, to determine her position it is necessary to measure one navigational parameter whose line intersects the leading line. The accuracy of the observation will be all the higher the closer the angle between the leading line and the isoline is to 90 degrees.

Practical experience shows that intervals between observations should not exceed 10 minutes, and in particularly confined sections 5 minutes.

To determine the position quickly in narrows it is advisable to use the isoline lattice. To obtain observation it is sufficient to find the point of intersection of isolines plotted on the chart and those measured with the help of navigational parameters.

In narrows conditions are especially difficult. Therefore, it is impossible to provide recommendations for all possible cases. However, the commander should always proceed from his knowledge of the ship's manoeuvrability, local regulations and the need to observe safety measures.

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NAVAL FORCES

THE PACIFIC FLEET IN WORLD WAR II

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 38-41

[Article by Capt 1st Rank G. Ammon, cand. sc. (History): "The Pacific Fleet in War"]

[Text]

THE Pacific Fleet and the Order of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla played an important role in the war against militarist Japan in 1945. By the beginning of combat operations, the Pacific Fleet under Admiral I. S. Yumashev and its component part the North Pacific Flotilla under Vice-Admiral V. A. Andreyev comprised two cruisers, one leader, 12 destroyers, 78 submarines, over 200 torpedo boats, dozens of other fighting ships and over 1,500 combat planes. The Soviet fleet was smaller numerically, particularly in large surface ships, than the Japanese fleet.

The Pacific Fleet assisted the forces of the Soviet Army in defeating the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria and Korea and also in liberating South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Simultaneously the fleet laid mines, carried out mine sweeping and protected our sea communications.

The Order of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla (Commander Rear-Admiral N. V. Antonov) consisted of 19 river monitors and gunboats with powerful artillery weapons, over 100 ships of other classes and motorboats. The flotilla covered the assault crossing of the Amur and Ussuri by the Soviet forces and assisted their advance in the Sungari direction.

The operations of the fleet and the flotilla jointly with the land forces were coordinated by N. G. Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union.

Combat operations of the Soviet Armed Forces against imperialist Japan began on the night of August 8. The aviation of the army and the fleet delivered a massed attack on border fortifications, military installations of the administrative and industrial centres of Changchun and Har-

bin, railway centres, troop concentrations and the Seishin naval base.

The Pacific Fleet operated in two operational directions: on the eastern coast of Korea and in the area of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The fleet's aircraft and submarines disrupted enemy sea communications. Twelve submarines were operating in the Sea of Japan near the Hokkaido Island and South Sakhalin. On the approaches to the Soviet ports and naval bases ships installed defensive mined obstacles. Some submarines and surface ships carried out patrol duties and escorted convoys. The fleet's combat aircraft carried out aerial reconnaissance and the search for enemy submarines.

On August 11, the forces of the left wing of the 1st Far Eastern Front in cooperation with the Pacific Fleet mounted an offensive along the North-Korean coast. That same day the troops of the 56th Infantry Corps with the assistance of the North Pacific Flotilla passed over to the offensive in Sakhalin. Landings of seaborne forces were the most effective form of the fleet's assistance to the land forces. They were assigned missions to capture ports before the arrival of the retreating enemy troops there. This mission was successfully fulfilled. The Japanese Command was unable to evacuate a single land unit.

As a rule, the fleet's aviation delivered massive blows at the enemy ports on the eve of a seaborne landing. Thus, on August 9 and 10 over 600 sorties were flown against the ports of Yuki, Rashin and Seishin. Breaking through barrage fire the pilots destroyed enemy ships and coastal installations. Simultaneously motor torpedo boats attack-

ed these installations. As a result, the enemy defence of the ports was considerably weakened and nearly 20 transport ships which could have been used for evacuation of the troops were sunk.

The Soviet sea landing parties acted rapidly and daringly. First small reconnaissance detachments were landed from motor torpedo boats at the peers of the ports. They were followed by the Marines of the assault wave. Subsequent echelons of amphibious forces, consisting, as a rule, of Marine battalions and brigades were sent to the captured beachheads. In this way the sea landing parties captured the ports of Yuki and Rashin (on August 12 and 14). In Rashin the enemy lost in battle nearly 600 killed or taken prisoner. The Soviet sea landing party's losses totalled only seven men killed and 37 wounded. The capture of Yuki and Rashin created favourable conditions for capturing the naval base of Seishin—the most important enemy strong point on the coast of North Korea.

The sea landing in Seishin was among the biggest. Here the Soviet reconnaissance men landing from motor torpedo boats on August 13 encountered stiff enemy resistance and assumed the defensive. On August 14, a battalion of Marines arrived in Seishin on two ships and captured a beachhead up to two kilometres in frontage. During the night the enemy frequently launched counterattacks but the landing party supported by the ships' artillery and the fleet air arm stubbornly held the defences. In the morning of August 15, ships carrying the main force of the landing party numbering 5,000 men under command of Major-General V. P. Trushin arrived in the port. Twelve combat and ten landing ships took part in the operation. Captain 1st Rank A. F. Studenichnikov was in charge of the landing, which was completed very quickly. In only three hours, despite enemy resistance, the major part of the city was captured. With the arrival of transports bringing artillery and with fire support of the ships and aviation the Marines liberated the rest of the city in the second half of the day. In the evening the Soviet land forces entered the city.

Subsequent actions of the Marines were also successful. On August 18, in less than an hour, a landing party comprising only 800 seamen captured the port and city of Odejin. The naval base of Hengshan, covered from the sea by mine barriers and 280-mm batteries, surrendered on August 21. Over 6,000 officers and men were taken prisoner. The entire eastern coast of Korea was li-

berated in only 10 days. The local population warmly welcomed the Soviet soldier-liberators.

During these same days the sailors of the Pacific Fleet took part in liberating South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands from the Japanese invaders.

There were some 20,000 enemy officers and men and up to 10,000 reservists on South Sakhalin. Japanese naval forces were based at the ports of Otemari, Maoka, Esutoru and on the aerodromes there were a considerable number of combat planes. The North Pacific Flotilla was assigned the mission to capture a beachhead on the western coast of Sakhalin and to occupy the ports in order to prevent the invaders from fleeing.

The operation began with a blow by bomber and attack aircraft at the ports of Toro, Esutoru, Maoka and the Otemari naval base. The landing of Marines from motor boats and ships at Toro was a surprise for the defenders, who capitulated. The landing forces increased in strength. During the day several inhabited localities and the port of Esutoru were captured. A composite battalion of Marines captured the port of Maoka only an hour after landing. The enemy, having lost 300 officers and men in killed and 600 taken prisoner in battles for the city, began to retreat, pursued by the Marines.

The naval base of Otemari was captured by a landing party in four hours. Simultaneously the 113th Marine Brigade, which launched a land-based attack, approached the city. The 3,400 strong garrison of Otemari laid down its arms. The same day, units of the 56th Infantry Corps completed the liberation of South Sakhalin.

Stiff fighting developed during the liberation of two Soviet islands of the Kuril Ridge—Shumushu and Paramushiro whose garrisons numbered 23,000 men. The main Japanese naval base of the Kuril Islands Kataoka was located on Shumushu Island. The islands had strong anti-landing defences and represented the northern enemy beachhead close to the shores of Soviet Kamchatka.

The Shumushu landing party comprised over 60 ships of different kinds, half of them being transports or landing craft. They took on board over 8,000 men and 95 guns. The landing party sailed to Shumushu in a thick fog.

The landing on the island took place on an unorganised beach in the morning of August 18, and was a surprise for the enemy, who opened

sporadic fire. Gradually resistance increased. Five ships were damaged, fires broke out on some ships and craft. But the landing went on. The ships delivered intensive fire and repulsed attacks by the Japanese aviation. The enemy concentrated against the landing party strong infantry forces, several dozens of tanks and many guns. As in previous battles the Marines displayed mass heroism in the fighting.

As a result of powerful blows by aircraft, ships' artillery and the landing party's rapid attacks, the enemy capitulated. Towards the evening of August 23, 12,000 enemy officers and men were taken prisoner. By September 1, garrisons of other islands also laid down their arms.

The originally Russian lands of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were completely liberated from the invaders and became Soviet lands.

Formations of ships of the Order of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla cooperating with the vanguard of the advancing forces of the 2nd Far Eastern Front covered the assault crossing of such water barriers as the Amur, Ussuri and Sungari. The ships' artillery actively supported the advancing units. The flotilla transported over 100,000 men, hundreds of tanks, guns and thousands of motor vehicles.

In ten days the ships fought their way along nearly 1,000 km of rivers, assisting the speedy advance of the land forces. The enemy, stunned by the speed and power of the blows of the Soviet sailors was unable to make any effective use of his Sungari River Flotilla.

The manpower and equipment of the Order of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla was used in a rather different way. Gun ships covered delivery of troops by transport ships and landings of amphibious forces. In other cases fighting ships transported the landing detachments. The monitors — the main striking force of the flotilla — destroyed enemy fortifications with their powerful artillery and struck at his manpower and equipment, and

gave fire covering to troops and amphibious forces.

In a short time the Pacific Fleet and the Order of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla landed 21 amphibious forces using 260 ships and a considerable number of transport and landing craft for the purpose. The ships carried out reconnaissance of the ports, were employed to deliver troops, carried out all types of defence operations (the most dangerous being mine laying), and rendered fire support to the landing parties' operations on the shore. Landing operations were characterised by the high speeds at which they were prepared and carried out. As a rule, Marine detachments landed rapidly from the ships, motor boats and craft at moorings without any artillery bombardment, and captured the ports on the move. Landing parties cut the withdrawal routes of the Japanese troops, deprived them of not only sea but also the shortest land communication routes.

During this campaign the Pacific Fleet gave cover to considerable military transports. It escorted eighteen convoys which delivered over 35,000 men and nearly 20,000 tons of ammunition.

Precise operational cooperation between land and amphibious forces, the high level of operational-combat training of the fleet and flotillas promoted success in defeating the Kwantung Army. In the Far Eastern theatre of operations the victory was achieved by common efforts of all fighting services of the Armed Forces. Of enormous importance was well-organised and purposeful Party-political work, which ensured a high morale of the fighting men.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government highly appraised the feat of arms of the Pacific Fleet personnel. Thousands of sailors were awarded Orders and medals and 52 were honoured with the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Many formations and ships were awarded state decorations and naval flags, Guards Colours and honourable names.

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NAVAL FORCES

RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES ON LONG CRUISES

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 80 pp 28-29

[Article by Capt 1st Rank A. Yugov: "On a Cruise (Organisation of Crew's Leisure at Sea)"]

[Text]

A hurricane wind hurled foam-ing spray over the ship. Every hour thickened the ice on the technical equipment on deck, the deck itself and the superstructures. Even to steer the ship was becoming a difficult task. But the seamen remained staunch — for them it was all part of the day's work.

When the storm had abated and the exercises were over the crew gathered in one of messrooms for a concert of the amateur art group—dancers, singers and reciters.

The concert smoothed away the stress from the men who had been under such great moral and physical strain. It was a pleasure for performers and spectators alike.

The ship's commanding officer, Captain 2nd Rank I. Vorobyov and his deputy for political affairs Captain 3rd Rank V. Tishchenko attach great importance to the seamen's leisure on a cruise. Organised recreation helps to unite the crew, provides psychological relaxation for the men, raises their spirits and readiness for work.

This is a ship where every minute is valued, not only the time set for military and political education, but the periods of rest too. The more so as there is not so much time left over after watches and training. So it is important to make rational use

of it and get the utmost profit from it. And so, before putting out to sea, the commanding officer, his deputy for political affairs and the Party and Komsomol activists had discussed in detail everything concerning the organisation of the crew's leisure, mapped out precisely who could speak and on what subject, how to make the best use of films, slides and visual agitation aids, what music should be played and so on according to the topic for the evening.

Much attention was paid to bringing the ship's library up to date and to how it was to function during the cruise. On a ship books are a source of knowledge, they are a means for the seamen's ideological enrichment and moral improvement bringing them pleasure and inspiration.

For the ship's library to be up to the requirements it must first of all be fully stocked with books on political, military and moral subjects as well as fiction. Regular systematic renewal of the book stock with modern literature contributes to this. It is important that the books' content should correspond as fully as possible to the tasks facing the ship's crew and the seamen's spiritual interests. The requirements of those who are studying the theory

of Marxism-Leninism and politics, were taken into account when replenishing the library.

The tasks of the ship's amateur art group were another object discussed.

Amateur art activities in a military collective are an effective means of binding the men in a military collective, they inculcate healthy tastes and widen the men's cultural horizons. They are a good help to the CO and political worker, the Party and Komsomol organisations in educating the personnel. And a song, a dance or an apt joke help the sailor to pass his leisure time and give him a good moral bracing up.

Far from their home shore, the seamen display an exceptionally big interest in the life of their country and events taking place in the different parts of the globe. Understandably in these conditions the radio acquires special significance. And as usually all sorts of questions occur to the men when they listen to broadcasts, it was decided to tape the latest news and then give a repeat transmission.

Many were the forms and means of cultural and educational work used on the cruise.

...One evening, the sailors, star-shinas and officers off duty assembled in the mess room. After a heated

discussion of the latest "Combat Leaflets" about such of the ship's best specialists as Mitchman V. Polyakov, a request programme of songs was played over the ship's broadcasting system. Then the conversation turned on the traditions of the crew. Young servicemen and others who were by no means "rookies" but had sailed on many a cruise, joined in. Some spoke of the necessity to master the arms and technical equipment thoroughly, to learn to handle them skillfully in battle; others voiced praise for the wonderful traditions of helping young sailors to make rapid progress in learning their speciality and acquiring practical skills and for the crew's keenness to accomplish all their tasks at the exercises excellently. The conversation was interesting and animated, and capably and unobtrusively steered by the ship's political worker Captain 3rd Rank V. Tishchenko.

Of course, this does not mean that talk about the ship's traditions was absolutely spontaneous. It had been planned beforehand. The political worker and the ship's propagandist, Lieutenant Commander V. Glubkov, had had preliminary discussions with the seamen and advised them what subject to take up and what questions to elaborate on. This made the talk concrete and to the point. Examples and facts listed were not fortuitous, they were the most typical and instructive. Each participant in the talk had a chance to express his opinion and argue it out.

The seamen still remember the evenings on the theme: "We'll reliably safeguard all our people has created." Each leisure evening was dedicated to one of the Soviet republics. Here it, for instance, how the evening dedicated to the Georgian SSR proceeded. The ship's propagandist told his audience about the republic's achievements in building communism and the unbreakable friendship of the Georgian people

and the peoples of the other Soviet Republics. Concrete details to the general picture drawn by the propagandist were provided by sailors and starshines who had visited Georgia during their furlough before the cruise. The participants of the evening visited, as it were, the Republic's industrial centres, its tea plantations, scientific and cultural institutions and got to know the art of the Georgian people. After that came poems and songs about Soviet Georgia.

Such evenings help to develop the servicemen's love for their multi-national Homeland, inspire them with pride in the Soviet people, strengthen friendship among the crew and improve mutual understanding between the servicemen of different nationalities.

Very popular during the cruise were competitions of a rather original kind between the different sections. Representatives of each section had to answer questions on the ship's equipment and different mechanisms, to speak about the crew's traditions, the best specialists and interesting facts from the combat activity of seamen of a definite speciality during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). The section won whose members gave precise answers quicker than their rivals.

Various contests, competitions and collective discussions of the books read were held in the Lenin Cabins of the departments.

The servicemen were especially interested in films. A favourite of all was the film festival dedicated to Soviet sport.

Different principles laid down in the USSR Constitution and the rights and obligations of the Soviet citizens were explained to the seamen in talks over the ship's broadcasting system. Several broadcasts were dedicated to military subjects and to life on the ship. One of them featured congratulations to the seamen who were marking their birthday. Then the entire crew heard the recorded voices of their parents.

"Nothing is easy and simple in life," they heard Seaman A. Kharchenko's father, a participant of the Great Patriotic War, say. "Soviet power was won and consolidated in battle and in intensive labour. We safeguarded the freedom and independence of our Motherland in fierce battles with the Nazis. Millions of Soviet people laid down their lives so that there always would be sunshine and happiness in every home. A difficult road lay before our generation. But we travelled it with honour. And there is no greater happiness than to know that our sons are worthy of their grandfathers and fathers. We know that service in the Navy is a stiff test for a young man, and a measure of his merits. But it is also a good school. May it teach you to defend your Homeland courageously and staunchly. There may be difficulties on your way. But travel the road as befittingly and honestly as we travelled it. Remember that you represent the valiant Soviet Navy."

The seamen remembered this letter for a long time.

A man enjoys his leisure when he does something he loves — reads, plays games or music, makes things and so on. There is a literary circle on the ship. During the cruise its members attended lectures by Mitchman A. Gavrilov on the fundamentals of the history of literature, on the work of leading Soviet writers and poets and also on classics of our own and foreign literature. The works of members of the crews were also discussed.

Swimming and sea exercises always provide a serious examination for the entire crew. For every officer, mitchman, starshine and sailor they present a test in skill, will power, staunchness and ability to overcome difficulties. On this cruise too the crew fulfilled the set tasks. This was the result, along with other factors, of the good organisation of the crew's leisure.

Captain 1st Rank A. YUGOV

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NAVAL FORCES

SHIPBOARD PHYSICAL TRAINING METHODS

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 12, Dec 80 pp 60-61

[Article by Captain 1st Rank A. Pylyov: "Physical Training Aboard Ship"]

[Text]

Being in top physical shape enables seamen to withstand the rigours of cruises and combat training and to maintain their capacity for work. Regular training sessions develop and perfect the special physical and psychological qualities and applied motor skills necessary for effective handling of equipment on sea and shore.

Physical exercise also compensates for the necessarily limited movement during extended cruises and neutralises its unfavourable effect on the body.

Obviously there are no gyms on a ship; the training venue for the personnel are the deck, crew's quarters and other premises, and the aquatorium surrounding the ship. For this reason organisational and methodological measures, including the preparation of areas for workouts, as well as training of physical training instructors are of great importance.

The peculiarities involved in organising physical training measures during a cruise require inventiveness and resourcefulness on the part of instructors. The commander selects instructors for training sessions from among the most fit officers, and their assistants from among petty officers.

The upper deck, superstructures and ship apparatuses are prepared in good time for physical training sessions, and the requisite equipment and gear are set up.

During workouts instructors should take into consideration the heightened fatigue of the personnel on an extended cruise and the influence of the overall limitation of movement and thus gear physical loads to the general state of the seamen.

Training exercises and methods are selected with an eye to developing and restoring those physical qualities which are lost most of all. Thus, during a long voyage the strength and tenacity of the leg muscles drop markedly. For this reason training sessions include running in place and throughout the superstructures, and various jumping exercises. In order to heighten interest it is imperative to vary exercises, hold competitions and provide encouragement.

The specific conditions of the ship require special attention to safety measures. Dangerous objects and sharp corners should be cordoned off where possible. Equipment should be tightly secured. Stand-by's during exercises are a must.

Physical training exercises aboard ship are of a comprehensive nature. They are alternated with gymnastics, swimming or rowing. Also acceptable is a mixed variant of training, when one subunit engages in rowing or swimming during a comprehensive session.

Training sessions are scheduled in such a way as to allow each crew member to work out two or three times a week. The programme necessarily includes walking, running, jumping, floor exercises, acrobatics, and exercises on sports and special equipment: horizontal bar, horizontal cable, gymnastics frame, vertical cable, and thwart, and with weights, skipping ropes, isometric equipment, and medicine balls. Exercises on the storm ladder, spar ladder and trampoline may also be done.

The staging of comprehensive workout session for the entire personnel simultaneously requires specific organisational work: the elaboration of the overall goal, procedure, distribution and alternation of places, responsibilities of the persons conducting or providing for the exercises, and other matters.

A comprehensive session consists of three parts: preparatory (8-10 minutes), basic (30-35 minutes) and concluding (3-5 minutes). The preparatory part is a warm-up for the forthcoming load of the basic part of the session. It includes walking and running in place with variations, floor exercises, attention exercises, jumping in place on one and two feet with turns and various positions of the arms.

The exercises in the preparatory part are done simultaneously by everyone in the team at the command of the head instructor, who stands in a spot convenient for observation. Group leaders stand in front of their subunits; they

monitor the quality of the exercises and provide the requisite assistance and recommendations.

If an exercise is simple and easily understood, the instructor gives the command to start immediately after explaining it. Simple instructions are given during walking and running in place without stopping the exercises. If an exercise is difficult it is learned beforehand.

The basic part of the exercises covers the main physical training tasks on a cruise. It usually includes three groups of exercises: first in two places with a change of places (10-15 minutes in each place), followed by jogging and negotiating obstacles (5-10 minutes).

It will be noted that there are exercises at the beginning of the basic part which must be learned and memorized. The second half of this segment of the workout is devoted to simple, familiar exercises featuring the line or group method.

Exercises on the horizontal cable are done by two or three men simultaneously. Safety teams work in shifts. Special attention is devoted to safety in jumps here. As a rule, jumps are executed only from a hanging position, and crawling along the cable — in a line, one after the other.

Dumbbells, barbells and other weights are lifted on a wooden mat or a hempen strip. Weights are placed down carefully so as not to damage the deck.

In learning acrobatic exercises a group is divided into two's and three's, which stand by one another. Methods of crawling along the storm ladder, star ladder and vertical rope are learned above the deck. mats are placed under equipment and stand-by's step on them.

When training on the lower boom exercises are initially carried out individually at a slow pace with stops, so that the sailors could secure footing and adapt themselves to the height above the water surface. It is important to see to it that the seamen and the petty officers look ahead, keeping their foothold in their field of vision. Difficult exercises (double separation, etc.) are first learned on the deck, and then on the lower boom.

Rowing exercises are recommended while the ship is at anchor. During a cruise simulated rowing exercises, rigging, etc. can be developed on fastened launches.

Running on the ship and negotiating obstacles is conducted in a double column headed by the group instructor. The running must be done at a fast clip so as to avoid accumulation of men on ladders and in narrow passageways. In case of delays in front of obstacles the groups run in place kicking their knees high. The speed increases as they familiarise themselves with the distance. The route includes narrow, winding and low passageways, inclines and declines on slanted and vertical ladders, crawling through hatches and jumping over obstacles. All objects

along the distance presenting a danger to the runners are removed or cordoned off. Running and movement during a change in the venue of workouts proceed: starboard towards the bow and port side towards the stern.

The concluding part of the workout session is designed to bring the body into a relatively calm state. At the end the results are summed up and individual assignments given.

CIVIL DEFENSE

LATVIAN CIVIL DEFENSE CHIEF REVIEWS YEAR'S EFFORTS

LD021413 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 12 Feb 81 p 4

[Article by Latvian SSR Civil Defense Staff Chief Maj Gen Kh. Abol: "A Matter of Great Importance"]

[Text] Civil defense is an integral part of the country's defense capability. Its task is to protect the population and national economic sites from mass-destruction weapons and to carry out rescue and emergency restoration work in areas of devastation and in the event of natural disasters and major industrial accidents.

The last training year in the republic's civil defense system was devoted to ensuring a fitting greeting for the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth, the 35th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War and the 40th anniversary of the reestablishment of Soviet power in Latvia. There was widespread socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress.

The training of leadership and command personnel increased and this in turn improved the quality of the training of nonmilitarized formations for action in areas of devastation and in eliminating the consequences of industrial accidents and natural disasters.

Positive experience of organizing and conducting classes, in accordance with the stipulated programs, with various categories of workers and employees and the nonworking population was accumulated.

Comprehensive on-site exercises [kompleksnyye obyektovyye ucheniya] were further developed. They have become the chief way of preparing sites, non-militarized formations, workers and employees for defense against mass-destruction weapons. Full-scale exercises were held to a high standard at enterprises of the Riga state electrical equipment plant and "Radiotekhnika" Production Association, the Riga Audums Silk Production Association in Riga, the TETS-1, the Daugavpils Lenin Komsomol chemical fiber plant, the Liepaya Sarkinays Metalurgs plant, at the Uzvara, Banga and 9 May Fishery Kolkhozes and at most national economic establishments in Tsesiiskiy Rayon. Wide use was made of experience accumulated in the republic of conducting exercises with groups of small sites situated in rural localities.

The overwhelming majority of the leaders of national economic sites are fulfilling their duties as civil defense chiefs with a high sense of responsibility. I must single out the names of O. Lenev, R. Shchupanovskiy, N. Golodov, V. Nizhnik, I. Bumburs, I. Novikov, M. Lisments, G. Saltays and many others who are skillfully solving civil defense tasks and promptly and efficiently generalizing and introducing into practice all advanced experience.

We must continue to improve the forms and methods of organizing and conducting comprehensive on-site exercises and exercises involving groups of small sites.

Civil defense courses--genuine centers for learning training methods--play a major role in training leadership and command personnel and in the conduct of exercises. Republic courses and civil defense courses in Liyepay, Daugavpils and Riga's Kirovskiy Rayon are solving their tasks successfully. We must continue to improve course training and study methods and make wider use of base facilities and technical training facilities.

In analyzing the results of the past training year we must not omit to note individual shortcomings alongside the positive experience. In certain enterprises the fulfillment of civil defense tasks is treated as a secondary matter and there is no comprehension of their importance. The ispolkoms of some local soviets also do not devote sufficient attention to this work. We have serious claims to make against Valdemarpils Gorispolkom and Stendaskiy Settlement Ispolkom. Here the program for training nonmilitarized formations has not been fulfilled completely, and a number of other tasks have not been resolved.

Socialist competition is of great significance in the accomplishment of the plans and programs for preparing national economic sites and the population for defense against mass-destruction weapons. When mounting competition special attention must be drawn to the achievement of the best practical results and the creation of the conditions for the successful fulfillment of the adopted pledges; work methods must be persistently improved and various forms of moral and material incentive for competition leaders must be employed.

A number of civil defense staffs have accumulated valuable experience in organizing competition for the best installation, the best unit, team, group and the best section.

In reviewing the results the victors are awarded challenge pennants, cups and also the insignia "Ready for the Civil Defense of the USSR" and "Excellent Civil Defense Worker of the USSR." For example, the competition among medical posts in Riga's Proletarskiy Rayon was carried out instructively.

Raising the quality of the instruction of the nonmilitarized formations and the whole population in protection against mass-destruction weapons is helped by the propaganda of civil defense knowledge and the progressive experience accumulated by staffs. Among the various forms of this propaganda, civil defense days are highly recommended.

Just such a measure was held last year in Valka, in particular. Taking part in its preparation and execution were V. Avots, first secretary of the raykom; R. Bondareva, chairman of the rayispolkom; responsible workers of the raykom and the rayispolkom and of the Komsomol and trade union raykoms; members of the Znaniye Society; installation and site leaders; war and labor veterans; and workers in the mass media and propaganda media. The civil defense days held at enterprises of the state electrical plant, Riga and Rigas Audums Production Associations and at many other of the republic's national economic installations were full of interest.

In the current training year civil defense studies will be held in general education schools. They must be conducted to a high ideological and methodological standard.

There are also other effective forms of the propaganda of civil defense knowledge which have vindicated themselves. These are week-long, 10-day and month-long campaigns, exhibitions, questions-and-answer evenings, quizzes and movie festivals. All these must be widely used.

Every day brings us closer to the 26th party congress. The preparation for this has made a vivid impression on the whole sociopolitical life of the country. A new boost to labor and political activity has been engendered by the nationwide discussion of the draft "Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR." While engaged in peaceful creative labor, Soviet people do not forget the need to strengthen the state's defense capability. Guided by the demands of the party and relying on the accumulated experience, the labor collectives will continue work to improve the republic's civil defense.

CSO: 1801

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENT ON EVENTS LEADING TO WORLD WAR II

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 46-48

[Article by Col (Res) I. Chelyshev, cand. sc. (History): "The 'Phony War'"]

[Text]

On the evening of August 31, 1939, a group of 55 men dressed in Polish military uniforms forced their way into the radio station of the town of Gleiwitz (Gliwice) situated on the Polish border, staging a mock raid by "Polish" troops. The masters of the Third Reich needed this provocation as a pretext for launching their pre-orchestrated invasion of Poland.

At 0445 hrs the next day the nazi air force executed massive bombardments of Polish cities. The Wehrmacht's infantry invaded the country. World War II had begun.

When it launched the aggression, the grouping of nazi troops had an overwhelming superiority in manpower and equipment over the Polish Army. Only immediate and effective aid from Britain and France, Poland's Allies, could change the situation.

On September 3, Britain and France declared war on Germany, but demonstrated no intention of undertaking decisive actions. The reassuring telegrams of the Commander-in-Chief of the French land forces General Gamelin were of little help to the Polish troops who, despite the courageous and stern resistance offered by many units and garrisons, were in an extremely difficult position. The Allies did not act, although the alignment of forces was in their favour. On September 3 there were 86 French and 4 British divisions on the Western front. They were opposed by only 23 German divisions, which were without tank and motorised units. The Allies possessed absolute superiority in aviation, tanks and artillery as well.

The military leaders of the Third Reich were afraid of an Allied offensive. Former Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht High Command General Field Marshal Keitel admitted afterwards: "If the French and British had launched an offensive, all we could have sent up against them was the semblance of a defence." But the apprehensions of the nazi generals were unjustified. The "guarantees" of the British and French to Poland proved to be merely words. By late September the Polish Army suffered complete destruction.

Admittedly, on September 9-12, ten French divisions launched a limited offensive in the area of Saar; however, after having advanced some 15 kilometres they were instructed to halt, despite weak enemy resistance.

After Poland's fall the French forces left the Saar region without giving battle and took up positions along the fortified Maginot Line. Large British expeditionary forces which had landed in France occupied an area on the front's northern flank. The Allied Command issued strict directives forbidding unit commanders to show any combat initiative whatsoever. The nazi Command, which was preparing for a decisive strike against France, kept their guns silent as well. The complete quiet that ensued came to be called the "phony" or the "sitting" war.

In order to rouse the people to the war the British and French leaders had to clearly define its goals and summon the popular masses to a decisive struggle. The active participation of the people in it, however, did not enter into the

plans of the ruling classes. They were more concerned over the growing revolutionary and labour movement in their countries than nazi Germany. The British Home Department was empowered to incarcerate "unreliable persons" without due process and to ban newspapers without explanation or right of appeal. All these measures instantly affected progressive individuals and publications. In France the Communist Party was outlawed and progressive organisations and trade unions dissolved. The authorities imprisoned thousands of Communists and democrats, true sons of France who had called for all-out resistance against the nazis. At the same time the Daladier government took no measures to thwart the activity of pro-fascist and capitulationist elements which had penetrated all state bodies and the army.

What were the reasons for this policy and strategy of the Western powers? Why did Britain and France allow the Reich to make short work of Poland, not lifting a finger for the next eight months?

These questions are still controversial issues among bourgeois historians. Many works published in Britain and France often contain assertions to the effect that Allied policy and strategy during the period of the "phony war" were the result of the mistakes and indecisiveness of political and military leaders, the military and economic weakness of Britain and France, the fallacies of French military doctrine, etc. These contentions are only a partial explanation for the "phony war," however.

The essence of the "phony war" was that British and French leaders had in effect not even considered waging war against nazi Germany. The plan of world imperialism was to direct German aggression eastward, against the Soviet Union. "British and French strategy is unclear and illogical," writes Soviet historian V. G. Trukhanovsky, "when viewed from the standpoint of waging war against Germany, but it immediately becomes clear and logical in the light of the fact that its goal was not to fight for victory over Germany, but to enable Germany to 'switch' to war with the Soviet Union."

The "phony war" policy was a continuation of the Munich policy of the Western powers.¹ It also

came as no surprise to the leaders of the Third Reich. All their plans and goals stemmed from the supposition that the Western powers would not engage in active combat against Germany. On August 31, 1939, the Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht's land forces General Halder wrote in his diary: "The Fuehrer is calm... He is counting on the French and British not entering German territory." It was in pursuance of this policy that the Allies did not furnish aid to Poland. It was handed to Hitler because it had to be a springboard for nazi Germany for the invasion of the Soviet Union.

Jean Zay, a former minister in the Daladier government, wrote in his memoirs: "The resolve to give Germany free reign in Eastern and Central Europe... was demonstrated much earlier than the September crisis. It was a principled decision taken after lengthy and serious consideration."

In his work "The Cold War and Its Origins," the American historian D. Fleming writes that it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Poland was sacrificed as intentionally as Czechoslovakia; for the signers of the Munich Agreement Poland was just another distraction for the German mania for seizing territory in the East, which was intended to give them some additional time, if not to lead to a Soviet-German confrontation.

The Western powers were thus not concerned with the fate of the small countries, which were mere pawns in their anti-Soviet struggle. The Soviet Union alone fought consistently and steadfastly to hamstring the nazi aggressors and to create a system of collective security. During the Munich crisis, for example, the USSR alone came out in defence of Czechoslovakia, declaring its readiness to furnish the country aid in the form of troops. This proposal, however, was rejected by the bourgeois Czechoslovak government. In the summer of 1939 the reactionary Polish government declined an offer of cooperation with the USSR which would have allowed Soviet troop movement across Polish territory in case of a military conflict with Germany.

The Czechoslovak and Polish peoples became victims of nazi aggression as a result of the anti-Soviet course of the imperialist powers and the anti-Soviet and anti-national policies of their bourgeois governments.

The complete silence on the German-French front following the fall of Poland which was so characteristic of the "phony war" sparked hopes among British and French leaders that their clever designs would work and that Germany would

¹ The Munich Agreement on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, signed in Munich in September 1939 by Britain, France, Germany and Italy. The agreement was supported by the United States. In accordance with it Britain and France agreed to the handing over of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland to Germany in an attempt to prompt the latter to attack the USSR. The agreement foreordained the seizure of the whole of Czechoslovakia by Germany and led to the outbreak of World War II.

start war with the USSR. They were counting on a swift conclusion of peace with Germany and the formation of a united front with it against the Soviet Union.

The essence of the "phony war" politics becomes still clearer in view of certain facts pertaining to British and French preparations of war against the USSR which have come to light at present.

Many bourgeois historians contend that the war plans against the Soviet Union never went further than the blue-print stage and arose solely from a desire to aid Finland in the Soviet-Finnish War.¹ Official documents, as well as research works and Western memoirs disprove these assertions.

The war plans against the USSR were hatched prior to the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War. In September 1939 a chiefs of staff committee of the British armed forces compiled a document entitled "The Advantages and Disadvantages of England's Declaring War on Russia." At the same time defence coordination minister Lord Yaffield sent the military a report entitled "Russia's Vulnerable Oil Regions."

In early 1940 Air Force General R. Stehlin was about to leave for Finland as part of a French military mission. Before his departure he was received by deputy chief of staff of the French Air Force who showed him a map with the general war plan against the USSR. "I was surprised and flattered," Stehlin recalls, "to have been briefed confidentially on such a big operation; drawn on the map before me were two curved lines — one stretching from Finland, the other from Syria. They ended in the form of arrows, joining to the east of Moscow." A large contingent of Allied troops was being prepared to be sent to Finland.

Plans for an invasion of the Soviet Union continued to be drawn up even after the signing of the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty. It was at this time that General Gamelin modified the "war plans for 1940," re-emphasising the need for preparing for military actions against the USSR. Paul Reynaud, the new head of the French government, wrote a letter to the British premier insisting on decisive military actions in the Caucasus on the part of the Allies for the purpose of "paralysing the entire Soviet economy."

The preparations for aggression against the USSR was accompanied by the orchestration of an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign pointing to the "aggressive nature of the Soviet Union." The French journalist de Kerillis wrote: "An indescribable frenzy has gripped the consciousness of the bourgeoisie. The spirit of the Crusades has descended like a storm. The watchword here is 'War against Russia!' ...The fever of anticommunism has reached its paroxysm and has taken the form of epilepsy."

Even when the Third Reich seized Denmark and launched operations in Norway, the Allies did not abandon their plans for war against the USSR. At a session of the war cabinet on April 12, Paul Reynaud demanded that the bombardment of the Caucasus be hastened. On April 17, the Commander-in-Chief of French forces in the Middle East reported officially that the operations against the Soviet Union would be prepared by late June or early July, 1940. On April 28 the Allied High Command underscored in their decision the need for constant readiness for the execution of the invasion of the USSR.

It was thus a question of the realisation of world imperialism's long-standing plans for a joint campaign against the world's first socialist state. French historian J. Madaule comes right to the point about this, the major goal of British and French rulers: "If a Franco-British expedition to Finland had taken place, there would have arisen the need to conclude peace with Germany, which would have wasted no time in uniting with the Western countries against Soviet Russia. Everything would have eventually ended in an anti-communist crusade against Russia led by Germany and engulfing the whole of Europe."

It should be pointed out that an active role in the implementation of the Munich policies, of which the "phony war" was a part, was played by the United States. On September 30, 1938, the German ambassador reported from Washington that 'the Munich Agreement was greeted with a sense of ease in America... everyone was struck by Hitler's pervasiveness.'

An American diplomatic mission was in Europe in February and March of 1940. It was headed by Assistant Secretary of State S. Welles, who conducted negotiations with Mussolini, Hitler, Daladier and Chamberlain. It took great pains to reconcile the Western powers with the Axis countries. The goal was obvious: to organise a joint struggle against revolutionary forces, the Soviet Union in particular.

Although the destruction of the Soviet state entered into the plans of the Nazis, the way-laying

¹ The Soviet-Finnish War (November 1939-March 1940) broke out as a result of the anti-Soviet policies of Finnish leaders spurred on by British, French and US imperialists.

of Western countries was also part of their blueprint for world domination. Nazi Germany intended to attack the Soviet Union only after reducing France, securing hegemony in Europe and thus buttressing its economic and military potential which would enable it to risk war with the USSR.

The "phony war" ended with the capitulation of France in June 1940 and with Britain in mortal danger. The Third Reich had seized almost all of Europe and was planning an invasion of the American continent following the destruction of the USSR. Such was the result of the adventuristic, anti-Soviet policy of the imperialist powers.

Today, when the imperialists are once again whipping up an anti-Soviet hysteria, this tragic lesson of history clearly reveals what is behind the myth of the "Soviet military threat," and calls upon all who cherish peace and freedom to be vigilant and resolute in the struggle against the aggressive plans of imperialism.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTS ON CHINA'S AGGRESSIVE POLICIES

MOSCOW SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 49-51

[Article by Yu. Lugovskoi (Lugovskoy): "Peking's Undeclared Wars"]

[Text]

RECENT events show that China's invasion of Vietnam in the beginning of 1979 was not an isolated phenomenon in Peking's policy in Asia. It was the direct outcome of the general expansionist course steered by the Peking leaders on the continent. In this connection we can positively state that the hopes of some observers in Asia that the successors might alter China's hegemonic foreign policy after the death of Mao Ze-dong proved futile.

The most outstanding phenomenon is China's continued rapprochement with the United States of America. It should be mentioned that the contacts between these two powers have advanced from mere "normalisation" of relations towards cooperation on a militarist basis. The USA has removed even formal objections to the delivery of the latest weaponry from NATO's arsenals to China. More than that, the results of the visit of Harold Brown, head of the Pentagon, to Peking in January 1980 showed that the USA even agreed to supply China with the latest technology which can be used for military purposes. This circumstance has cast a sinister shadow on the situation in Asia. Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, has pointed out that the Sino-American collusion would constitute "a grave danger to India and the whole region."

Peking has reciprocated with overt encouragement of the USA's intensive preparations for war on the entire perimeter of the Asian continent. Leicester Wolf, a US envoy who visited China early this year, said that in talks with him the PRC leaders favoured "strong American military and political presence in Asia."

What does this "presence" imply? Facts have clarified this. Thus, after Brown's visit to Peking Xinhua Agency openly encouraged plans for the further expansion of the Pentagon's base complex on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. Peking is not in the least troubled by the fact that the complex is becoming one of the main bases of the Fifth US Fleet in the Indian Ocean and quick reaction force in a big Asian region which Washington has included in the "arc of instability." In particular, the purpose of the USA is to prepare new means for action against the rise of the national-liberation movement in the Middle East, South and South-East Asia.

It is a fact that Peking has long been eager to turn Asia into a "zone of storms." To this end it has been provoking conflicts between neighbouring countries. The Peking hegemonists have trained on these countries their missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. A Japanese bulletin writes that Chinese nuclear missiles deployed in Tibet have been trained on the towns and cities of India, Mongolia, Bangladesh and other states. It is not surprising, therefore, that Peking's relations with Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, India and other countries of South-East and South Asia remain strained or even critical.

Though Peking has stepped up its diplomatic activities in Asia, nothing has changed essentially in this sense. In keeping with Deng Xiaoping's "two-tier diplomacy" concept, the fact that China maintains official relations with one country or another does not mean that Peking has stopped supporting various rebel and separatist groups which are a means for its concealed intervention

in the internal affairs of those countries. Reactionary circles of the USA and other Western countries granting support to Peking have prompted it to display increasing arrogance and aggressiveness in relations with its neighbours.

This is graphically illustrated by the recent events in and around Afghanistan. Since the April 1978 revolution Peking has been sending one armed gang after another to the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan. Interventionist gangs are being trained both in Pakistan and in the Chinese province of Xinjiang. According to data officially published in Kabul the number of bandits trained in China itself has reached 40,000. Crossing the border illegally counter-revolutionary gangs resort to sabotage, terrorism and other methods in an effort to restore the outdated feudal order in Afghanistan and abolish the achievements of the April revolution. In particular, Peking bases its calculations on the activities of pro-Maoist groupings. These subversive elements and others like them actively participated in the mutiny in Herat and attempted to complicate the situation in Kabul. Peking's special services helped establish direct ties between pro-Maoist groupings and the so-called Moslem brothers who are operating under the patronage of the USA CIA. Peking agents are especially active near the Wakhan Corridor, where Afghanistan borders on China. There, in virtually impassable highlands, the gang of the feudal lord Rekhmankul was active for a long time. It was 500 strong, all the men were wearing Chinese uniforms. Another gang equipped with Chinese arms operated in the province of Badakhshan. And though these gangs have been eliminated, more and more saboteurs are being infiltrated regularly by China. Such infiltration assumed especially great scope early this year immediately after Amin's conspiracy failed. At the time even a regular Chinese military unit crossed the Chinese-Afghan frontier. The "Times of India" wrote that the Maoists were moving very large quantities of military equipment to Pakistan by the Karakorum Highway. It pointed out that even if all the rebels were armed a lot would be left over. The Chinese leaders have long included in their strategic plans the creation of a base close to the oil-bearing regions of the Persian Gulf.

After Harold Brown's visit to China early in 1980 Peking and Washington began to complement one another's hostile acts against Afghanistan. Certain sources point out that during the talks with Brown Peking proposed the following "mutually advantageous version": the PRC would

support the Afghan rebels in Pakistan and the USA would, in turn, grant the PRC "special rights" to act in Indochina with a view to neutralising the policy of Vietnam and its allies. Washington "legalised" the "right" of the PRC to increase its aid to the "Red Khmer" detachments and to step up other activities against the lawful government in Kampuchea.

It appears that encouragement from across the ocean has so inspired certain quarters in Peking that the latter has publicly promised to teach Afghanistan "a lesson" similar to the one it taught India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. This frank statement is more like self-exposure. It shows once more that the Chinese military dragon is gnashing its teeth at many of its neighbours simultaneously.

Peking's intrigues in Afghanistan are part of its general plans of expansion. The Chinese leaders have long been hatching them in respect of Asia. This is also confirmed by the fact that Peking has not given up its armed provocations against Vietnam. A memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam pointed out that from March 1979 to January 1980 Peking staged over 1,500 such provocations. The Peking authorities have made it clear that they intend to launch another aggressive attack on Vietnam. Chinese troops are being concentrated on the Vietnamese frontier. The Peking leaders obviously cannot reconcile themselves with the fact that there is a united socialist Vietnam to the south of China and that Vietnam is pursuing an independent policy. They regard this as a serious obstacle to the realisation of their great power hegemonic aims. Hence the overt switchover to hostility and the organisation of military gambles against Vietnam.

The PRC is also intriguing against Laos, where the Peking agents keep "General" Van Pao's gangs on their payroll. In the past he was also in the service of the USA CIA. Peking still supports the remnants of the Pol Pot forces that have taken refuge in the mountains in the west of Kampuchea and in neighbouring Thailand.

Over a period of many years Peking has been giving support to anti-governmental groupings in Burma and Bangladesh. It has been encouraging the separatist movement of the tribes of Naga and Mizo in north-east India. Peking has been employing somewhat different methods in Indonesia and Malaysia. In those countries it places its stake on the use of Huachiao (Chinese residents), especially the well-to-do sections, as a "fifth column."

A comparison and thorough analysis of Peking's actions show that the main aim of the Chinese hegemonists in Asia is to establish their in-

fluence in the neighbouring countries. One of the most widespread methods in pursuit of this goal is territorial claims. It has been calculated that Peking has laid claims to at least three million square kilometres, an area equal to one third of China. Such claims are followed up by attempts to seize foreign territories. For instance, so far Chinese troops have taken over 36,000 square kilometres of Indian territory near Ladakh. This territory was seized as a result of the armed conflict provoked by Peking in the Himalayas in 1962.

History knows no other case of a state "disputing" practically all of its frontiers and demanding their "revision." Thus, Peking claims vast areas in the Soviet Far East and Central Asia, the whole of Mongolia, the Afghan part of the Pamirs — the "Wakhan Corridor." In recent years, contrary to international law, the Peking leaders have advanced claims to sovereignty over the whole of the South China Sea. That Peking's claims spread far and wide is evident from the fact that it wants to take over the islands of Sangmu, which are located at the southern extremity of the Malay Peninsula and the archipelago of Natuna near the island of Kalimantan. China also wants to take over the islands of Senkaku, which Japan regards as its own territory.

It is obvious that Peking actually refuses to conduct constructive talks to settle problems that have arisen as a result of conflicts it has provoked. Thus, the US "Christian Science Monitor" wrote that China was not inclined to start talks with India on questions of territory. Neither does Peking wish to discuss the unsettled issues with Vietnam. This gives the Chinese leaders a chance to aggravate the situation periodically in regions in which conflicts have erupted in the past.

It is worth noting that Peking focuses its attention on areas of outstanding strategic importance, including Burma. It would seem that the Chinese-Burmese treaty of 1960 on the frontier should have settled all territorial problems — both real and those artificially concocted by Peking. However, Peking is still actively interfering in the internal affairs of Burma. As in the past China supports the forces that are waging an armed struggle against the lawful government of Burma. A "New York

Times" correspondent reported from Rangoon that Peking not only provided them with arms, ammunition and military instructors, but also granted them asylum in Chinese territory so that they could renew their operations from there. In recent years the Peking leaders have repeatedly proclaimed that they would not interfere in Burma's affairs. However, despite this, the pro-Peking rebels in Burma have not given up their subversive activities. A Reuter correspondent writes that the rebels have not, apparently, given up their plan to form a base in the area where the territory of the Shan Autonomous Region of Burma wedges into the Chinese province of Yunnan. Peking's aim here is to create a sort of puppet state where the frontiers of Burma, India and Bangladesh meet. In keeping with Peking's plans this state is to play the same role as Kampuchea played under the Pol Pot regime.

The Peking leaders attach major importance to the islands in the South China Sea which control the strategic passages from the Pacific into the Indian Ocean. From these islands it will be possible "to extend a hand" to the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. The seizure of the Paracel Islands by the Chinese in 1974, Peking's claim to the archipelago of Spratly and also the Chinese naval manoeuvres in the South China Sea lead one to believe that Peking has produced a "concept of movement to the south by sea." In its comment on this assumption the "Indonesian Observer" remarked:

"Chinese military strategy provides for a gradual take-over of all islands Peking has laid claim to."

It is clear that such ambitions are a source of grave danger in the southern seas washing the coasts of Asia.

Falsifying facts, Peking propaganda is vainly trying to make it appear as if present-day China is the protector of Asian countries. However, events have shown that the real threat stems from the great power expansionist policy of Peking and its efforts to pursue a "parallel course" with the imperialists. This endangers the security and independence of Asian countries, above all of the countries directly bordering on China.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

PROSPECTS FOR DÉTENTE IN EUROPE VIEWED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 52-53

[Article by V. Yefremov: "Lasting Peace and Reliable Security for Europe"]

[Text]

For thirty-five years now the European continent, which during the first half of this century witnessed the outbreak of the two most destructive wars mankind has ever known has been living in peace. This tremendous achievement is largely the result of the active peace policy of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty, which marked its 25th anniversary in mid-May. This multi-lateral alliance of socialist countries has become a factor of peace in Europe and not only in Europe. Virtually all the most important decisions aimed at attaining détente and curbing the arms race are the fruits of the initiative of the socialist community countries.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to say definitively that European nations have been provided with reliable security. At the threshold of the 80s the imperialist forces mounted a counter-offensive against détente. They are stepping up the arms race once again and trying to wipe off the slate all the important achievements that have been scored in European cooperation — everything that was formalised in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki five years ago.

The notable worsening of the situation here came about not today and not yesterday and not at all because of the events in Iran and Afghanistan. It was brought on by the imperialist circles' alarm over the revolutionary changes taking place in the world: they have decided to turn back the clock to cold war times, hoping to reverse the march of history by playing power politics. It is precisely in pursuit of these reactionary aims that the imperialists of the US and NATO as a whole undertook a whole series of provocative actions. The most dangerous of these for nations' security are the NATO decisions taken late last year in Brussels to deploy in Western Europe new types of American nuclear missiles targeted at the USSR and the other members of the Warsaw Treaty. It is commonly known

that these decisions were adopted against the will of the European people, under crude pressure from those who least have their security interests at heart — the American militarists.

There is still a chance to halt the runaway arms race and, in particular, the emplacing of new American nuclear stock piles in Central Europe. The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, political parties representing the working class and other workers, trade unions, religious and other anti-war social organisations, realistically-minded West European leaders — such are the real forces which are capable of countering the instigators of war, bringing the arms race to a halt, and saving and advancing détente.

The potential for détente is particularly great in Europe, as it is here that détente has taken root most firmly. It is in Europe that the peace forces, led by communists, have been working most vigorously. The chronicle of their noble struggle is becoming richer with every passing day. On the 35th anniversary of the victory over nazism and the end of the Second World War in Europe, the World Peace Council, from the Hungarian capital of Budapest, made an address to the peoples of the world entitled "The Real Military Threat." At the same time a campaign was launched in France in 42 departments to collect signatures for a petition demanding the scrapping of the nuclear missile plans of the Pentagon and NATO. A meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties for peace and disarmament, convened at the initiative of the French Communist Party and the Polish United Workers' Party, was held in late April in Paris. Delegations from the fraternal parties of the East and West of the European continent took part in it. The call "For Peace and Disarmament" which the meeting participants adopted is permeated with the idea of the necessity for the extensive unification of all anti-war forces. The communists

deeded to all the peoples of the European countries. Peace is our common cause, and our joint struggle is capable of ensuring the triumph of this cause.

The communists urged the nations of Europe to work to bring about a reversal of NATO's decisions on the production and deployment of American missiles on the continent and the speedy ratification of the Soviet-American SALT-2 Treaty. They called for the convocation in 1980 of the Madrid meeting to discuss European security and cooperation, the holding of a European conference in Warsaw on military détente and disarmament, decisive measures at the Vienna negotiations, and for the reduction of armed forces and weaponry. The extensive programme of the continent's struggle for peace and disarmament advanced by the Communist and Workers' Parties at the Paris meeting has generated a powerful response on the part of the world public. It is being observed that the call "For Peace and Disarmament" is timely and relevant, that it has been a powerful catalyst in the struggle of social forces against the stepping up of the arms race and the military preparations of the NATO countries.

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation has been playing a truly inestimable role in strengthening peace and security on the European continent and throughout the world. This is convincingly attested to by the jubilee meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States held in mid-May in Warsaw.

The Declaration, the important political document adopted at the meeting, provides a thorough analysis of the present-day European and world situation and elucidates the reasons for its worsening. The Warsaw Treaty member-states are countering NATO's dangerous course with an extensive programme of actions designed to eliminate the threat of the resurrection of the cold war, to strengthen trust and mutual understanding in international relations and to set the course of events in a healthy, peaceful direction. They are energetically urging that all the principles and provisions of the Final Act be strictly and fully implemented.

The Warsaw Treaty member-states came out for the reaching of accords at all disarmament negotiations going on at present and for the resumption of talks in areas where they have been interrupted. It was noted at the meeting that the entering into force of the SALT-2 Treaty, whose ratification continues to be delayed by the American side, would be of signal importance in this respect. Negotiations on the limitation of medium range nuclear missiles in Europe are necessary and possible. The proposals of the Soviet Union in this regard are clear: if NATO reverses its decision to produce and deploy new types of American medium-range missiles or at least stops its implementation, negotiations on this important problem can begin. The meeting of the Political Consultative Committee thus provides reliable guidelines for advance toward the consolidation of peace in Europe and the rest of the world.

The results of the proceedings of the Warsaw meeting has made a deep imprint on the world scene. Specifically, the proposal for the convening of a world summit has generated extensive comment. This is not fortuitous, as peace is indivisible — all the nations of the world have a stake in it. The underpinnings of the future are forged today; what the future will be like depends on how crucial international problems are solved at the present stage. And those officials who try to brush aside a positive solution to questions of war and peace would be advised to remember that they will have to answer to their people for their actions.

Unfortunately, not all Western statesmen realise this, however. One does not have to go far to find examples. At the very same time the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member-states was in progress in the Polish capital, sessions of NATO's military organs, including the military planning committee, were being held in Brussels. (Representatives from France and Greece, which had left the NATO military organisation, were not in attendance.) Judging by press reports, the American representatives in the Belgian capital concentrated their efforts on preparing the West European countries for the "necessity" of the broadening of NATO activity. What is being referred to is Washington's desire to involve its bloc allies in its military gambles in the Middle and Near East, particularly in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan. The Pentagon representatives simultaneously demanded that their West European partners continue to step up the arms race and their military preparations in Europe. These facts speak for themselves. We'll say one thing: the full responsibility for these actions which run counter to the will of the peoples lies with the militarist leaders of the US and those who express their solidarity with them.

Despite the worsening of the international situation, the Soviet Union, guided by the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence, is prepared to continue dialogue with sober-minded West European leaders for peace, détente and mutual understanding on the continent. This is evidenced, among other things, by the negotiations between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Leonid I. Brezhnev, and President of the French Republic Valery Giscard d'Estaing, which took place on May 19 in Warsaw, with the participation of First Secretary of the PUPP Central Committee Edward Gierek. This was a day of great policy-making, of vital international activity. The meeting confirms the growing tendency on the European continent towards the continuation of interstate ties and the preservation and consolidation of détente and mutually advantageous cooperation in the interests of European and world peace. The exchange of views which took place during the negotiations is invaluable for the maintaining of peace and détente, the French president stated before leaving for Paris.

War is not inevitable; it can and must be averted. Defense must be developed. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are doing everything possible to see that these noble goals are attained. Their peace policy has won the respect and support of the world public at large, international organizations and sober-minded state and public figures. Leonid Brezhnev stated in Warsaw: "The strength of our policy is that it meets the vital interests of hundreds of millions of people in the whole world, all who need peace and not war, who cherish creation but not destruction, who strive for cooperation and mutual understanding between peoples, but not for alienation and enmity."

Europe needs lasting peace, creative building, cooperation and reliable security for the people inhabiting it. And not only Europe, but the whole world as well.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

REVIEW OF BOOK ON AFGHANISTAN

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 80 pp 56-57

[Review of the book "The Truth About Afghanistan. Documents, Facts, Eyewitness Reports," published by the Novosti Press Agency. Review by Yu. Lesokhin: "The Truth the Enemies Try To Conceal"]

[Text]

...The camera registers lighting. Bearded men wearing turbans launch an attack. One rush follows the other. Shots, shouts, groans of the wounded. One may think it's a detective film being shot. Nothing of the kind. Just the usual fraud. A film entitled "Fighters for Freedom Clear an Afghan Village of Communists" is being shot by a film group from distant Australia. Another fake documentary will be shown soon on TV. And the scene of the pseudo-documentary is not an Afghan village, but the frontier city of Peshawar from which counter-revolutionary gangs are sent to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The Australian TV swindlers were taken red-handed by V. Malarek, a Canadian "Globe and Mail" reporter who revealed in his article that scenes like the one described above can be seen every day in Peshawar. He cited a cynical and frank confession made by a West German

TV: "It's not facts we are interested in but the chance of a juicy story."

The Canadian journalist's article is further proof that the collection "The Truth About Afghanistan" * recently published by the Novosti Press Agency Publishing House in Russian, English and French and also in the Pushtu and Dari languages is of real actual interest. It exposes the lies spread by the western information agencies. And every unprejudiced reader who knows the facts of the events in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will understand this.

What are these facts?

The book shows that the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan established by the will of the Afghan people as a result of the April 1978 revolution was at once subjected to fierce attacks by external enemies. As soon as the anti-national dictatorial regime of Daoud was overthrown, the United States began to draw up plans for removing the democratic government in Kabul and regaining the positions lost by imperialism in the country. A well-known subversive technique was

resorted to: on the one hand the CIA agents operating in Afghanistan intensified their activity, and on the other a barrage of slanderous anti-Afghan propaganda was started. But the main hopes were pinned on the planned armed intervention against the young republic. Here the main role was assigned to Pakistan, an ally of the USA.

Let us examine some facts quoted in the book from the press.

As early as the spring of 1978 Louis Dupree, a CIA representative, appeared in Afghanistan. He established contacts with the monarchist and counter-revolutionary forces. But in November 1978 he was expelled from Afghanistan. Where did he go then? To Pakistan. There he headed a team of CIA agents which included Robert Lessart, Louis Robinson, Venan David, Rogers Brock... This team became a sort of headquarters for Afghan counter-revolutionary armed units. Then events developed as follows. A delegation of the National Liberation Front led by Sabatullah Mojadedi visited the USA. CIA funds were used to set up in the United States the Association of American Aid for Afghan Refugees and a National

* Collection. "The Truth About Afghanistan. Documents, Facts, Eyewitness Reports." The Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1980. 173 pp (in Russian, English and French).

Liberation Front of Afghanistan. With the CIA help leaders of the Afghan counter-revolution met in Pakistan early in 1979 and organised the so-called "committee of struggle." They set dates for armed actions.

Today the representatives of many Western countries keep harping on the "Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." Here are some admissions of press agencies, including American ones.

"The continuing success of the Muslim rebels in Afghanistan has touched off a debate in the Carter Administration over possible covert US intervention in the civil war between the insurgents and the Soviet-backed regime of Noor Mohammad Taraki."

"Newsweek" (USA), May 28, 1978.

"The stepping up of CIA activities in Pakistan press is linked with the schemes of American imperialism and Pakistan reactionary circles, which aim to use the gangs of Afghan counter-revolutionaries on the territory of Pakistan to exert constant pressure on the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. As for the flow of anti-Afghan and anti-Soviet stories which are being forced into the Pakistan press their role is to conceal the true state of affairs."

"Millat" (Pakistan), January 4, 1979.

As we see the words of the Carter Administration are at variance with their deeds. The US President who encouraged the rampage of counter-revolutionary gangs and supplied them with arms, ammunition and money is now indignant at the "Soviet aggression."

Replying to a "Pravda" correspondent, L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, clearly said: "We are helping the new Afghanistan at the request of its government to defend the national independence, freedom and honour of its country from armed aggressive actions from outside."

The book tells about the various kinds of assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to Afghanistan.

On March 27, 1919, the Soviet Government was the first state in the world officially to recognise Afghanistan as an independent and sovereign state. The Soviet representative informed the Afghan government that the Soviet Government was prepared to render Afghanistan all possible assistance, including arms, to defend its independence against the encroachments of the British colonialists, who could not reconcile themselves to the loss of their domination in that country.

In the following year, the book points out, agreement was reached between the two countries that the Soviet Russia would make Afghanistan a free grant of a million gold roubles, several aircraft and 5,000 rifles with ammunition, and would help Afghanistan to build a gunpowder plant and an aviation school. Agreement was also reached on sending technical and other Soviet specialists to Afghanistan.

Despite the fact that in those years the Soviet Republic was repelling armed intervention by 14 foreign powers and waging a struggle against internal counter-revolution, it was true to its internationalist duty, gave all the aid it could to the peoples fighting for their freedom and independence and did its best to help Afghanistan protect itself against attacks by internal and external reaction.

Subsequently, Afghan's northern neighbour repeatedly came to its assistance.

Now the Soviet Union openly declares that it will withdraw its military contingents from Afghanistan "once reasons for the Afghan leadership's request for them disappear." But the USA, Pakistan and China are increasing their interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. Such is the reality of today.

The collection speaks of the anti-Afghan activity of China. What are its forms? First, the training by the Chinese military instructors of coun-

ter-revolutionary gangs. Second, attempts to unite organisations of different colour which they control and which are hostile to the lawful government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. And, finally, constant delivery of arms to the bandits.

In his interview, which is included in the collection, Sayed Mohammad Gulabsol, Minister of the Interior of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, says: "According to our information about 40,000 bandits are being trained in China itself. The task of these bands is to enter Afghanistan illegally and, using every means, including subversion, assassination and terror, to undermine the gains of the April revolution."

Such a "lesson," the Chinese propagandists maintain, awaits all who do not want to frame their policy according to the Peking's formulas. It must be said that Peking "advisers" regularly take part in raids on the Afghan territory. Together with their "pupils" they set fire to peaceful villages, blow up hospitals and schools, brutally kill activists of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and shoot even school children.

Islamabad has been assigned an important role in implementing the hegemonic plans of Washington and Peking. The sole purpose was to involve the reactionary Pakistani government as deeply as possible into the risky gamble embarked upon by imperialism in the Middle East.

Excerpts from American newspaper "The New York Times" for the first month of the year, cited in the book, are very suggestive.

"Since the mid-1960s, however, China and Pakistan have maintained close relations and in recent years Peking supplanted Washington as Islamabad's major supplier of arms."

"The New York Times," January 3, 1980.

The United States and Pakistan began high-level discussions today

about a possible resumption of American military aid to the Islamabad government."

"The New York Times," January 13, 1980.

"Mr. Carter's sudden offer of military aid to Pakistan, as ugly a military dictatorship as exists today,.. makes a mockery at his longstanding policy against giving such help to such countries."

"The New York Times," January 22, 1980.

So "The New York Times," is embarrassed. But this feeling seems to be unknown to President Carter. He is continuing on a path which sober-minded Americans consider very dangerous. According to the American CBS radio and television company, in the initial stage, the Pentagon's plans provided for sending US military aircraft and pilots to Pakistan. The aircraft will be followed by American service personnel and equipment. The next stage includes American warships calling at Pakistan ports. At the final stage it is planned to bring US land troops into Pakistan.

The book tells about the assassination of President Taraki organised by the traitor Amin, gives testimonies of Jandad and Hadud, who participated in his assassination on Amin's instructions.

The collection recently published in Moscow is strictly documentary, containing facts and eyewitness accounts. This is the truth — a truth which some in the West are trying to conceal.

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